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ABSTRACT
This Article posits that treating social norms as isolated regularities, as is 
commonly done in the legal literature, misses the big picture of social norms. 
Analyses of the relations between social norms and the law consequently run the risk 
of becoming “just so stories.” Economic analyses of other-regarding behavior may go 
beyond the narrow view of self-interestedness yet they remain confined to the 
individual level of analysis. To account for the societal-level mechanisms underlying 
social norms, this Article outlines a model in which norms form interdependent 
systems. Societal emphases on cultural values define the backbone of an evolving 
body of particular norms. This model sheds new light on the nature of the rule of law 
and on its role in promoting social order. Testable hypotheses are derived and 
empirical evidence is marshaled for the proposition that the rule of law is not a 
universal, culturally independent norm.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical: A rancher from Shasta County, California comes to 
Berkeley, California with his dog. The rancher’s dog soils the sidewalk. Emboldened 
by Berkeley’s “pooper-scooper” municipal ordinance, a local pedestrian chastises the 
rancher: “Clean up. It’s the law.” What result?
When I presented this hypothetical to seminar participants at Boalt Hall 
School of Law in Berkeley, I was first treated to some anecdotes about Shasta County 
ranchers. After the laughs subsided, participants seemed to agree that the rancher 
would clean up after his dog. When I pressed for a reason, the answer was “because 
that’s what the law says.” In America, what the law says is of major importance. 
Absent severe (and rare) moral dilemmas that might call for civil disobedience, the 
fact that a particular injunction “is the law” usually means that it should be followed. 
In this view, “law and order” go together, the former being a precondition for the 
latter.
“It’s the law” is a statement whose purpose exceeds providing information 
about the prescribed behavior and potential liability for offenders. As the “Berkeley 
Hypo” above suggests, quite often this statement is asserted for moral suasion. The 
pedestrian does not threaten the rancher directly nor is she likely to report the rancher 
to the local authorities. The interaction on the Berkeley sidewalk may be hypothetical 
but it has an undeniable air of reality to it nonetheless. Anybody who saw the signs 
saying “Buckle up. It’s the law.” that pepper Massachusetts’s highways will readily 
confirm that. Officials at the Massachusetts Highway Department apparently consider 
2this message to be persuasive.1 The moral suasion element in the message “Buckle up. 
It’s the law.” is all the more evident when it is not directed to drivers or even to 
adults. This is the case, for instance, when the Washington Traffic Safety Commission 
directs this message to children.2 In all these cases, “It’s the law” essentially means 
“It’s the right thing.”
Rudimentary as it may appear at first blush, the Berkeley Hypo captures the 
gist of contemporary debates on social norms and the law. A growing number of legal 
scholars, primarily in law and economics, have become interested in the relations
between social norms and the law in recent years. Robert Ellickson’s path-breaking
study of extra-legal norms among Shasta County ranchers marks the inception of this 
renewed interest in social norms.3 To be sure, the insight that people’s practice may, 
and often does, depart significantly from what the law says is not new.4 What is new 
is the effort to identify the mechanisms that may underlie these social phenomena. 
Norms against littering in public places are the standard example for beneficial social 
1
 Massachusetts is not alone in this regard. Tennessee has also conducted a safety-belt use 
campaign based on the same slogan. See JOHN H. LACEY, RALPH K. JONES, & RANDALL G. SMITH, 
TECHNICAL REPORT: EVALUATION OF CHECKPOINT TENNESSEE: TENNESSEE'S STATEWIDE
SOBRIETY CHECKPOINT PROGRAM (1999), available online at 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/ChekTenn/ChkptTN.html (last visited ___).
2
 The Commission’s website enables visitors to purchase posters saying “Buckle Up. It’s the 
Law.” in both English and Spanish as well as “Buckle Up. It’s the Law.” coloring sheets for children. 
See http://www.wa.gov/wtsc/ordering.html (last visited ___).
3 Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986), later expanded in ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT 
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
4
 The seminal work is Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (observing that merchants often do not follow formal 
rules of contract law, do not litigate over contractual disputes, and settle without resorting to formal 
institutions); see also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neo-classical & Relational Contract Law, 72 NW U. L. REV. 854 (1978) (comparing 
classical contracts (enforced to the letter by courts) and neoclassical contracts (interpreted and updated 
by arbitration)).
3norms in this literature.5 Robert Cooter suggested Berkeley’s pooper-scooper 
ordinance as a case in point for harnessing the law to engender such norms.6 Together 
with other scholars, Ellickson conjectures that “the ordinance might embolden a 
pedestrian to chastise an irresponsible dog owner because the pedestrian could now 
say, ‘Clean up. It’s the law.’”7
By confronting the proverbial Californian rancher and pedestrian, the Berkeley 
Hypo calls this common conjecture into question. After all, if the law played a 
secondary (if not negligible) role in regulating the rancher’s behavior he may well 
miss the moral suasion element in the pedestrian’s admonition. Stated more generally, 
while we seem to have a grasp of the nature and potency of social norms, we still lack 
understanding of their structure, the factors that cause them to emerge, and their 
relations with the legal system. A notable deficiency in this regard is the equal 
treatment given to norms that are profoundly different in importance and prevalence. 
Thus, day-to-day behavioral regularities like cleaning after one’s dog are treated 
similarly to manifestations of racial discrimination.8
5
 This example is inspired by a series of studies led by Robert Cialdini. See Robert B. Cialdini, 
Raymond R. Reno, & Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept 
of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 1015 (1990); 
Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren, A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: A 
Theoretical Refinement and Reevaluation of the Role of Norms in Human Behavior, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1991); Raymond R. Reno, Robert B. 
Cialdini, & Carl A. Kallgren, The Transsituational Influence of Social Norms, 64 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC’L PSYCHOL. 104 (1993).
6 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach 
to Adjudicating The New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1675 (1996)
7 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 39 (2001) 
(referring to Cooter, id., id). For similar treatments of a pooper-scooper ordinance, see also Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2032 (1996) (hereinafter 
Expressive Function); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law And Social Norms, 86 
VA L. REV. 1603, 1603 (2000).
8 See below, text to note 105.
4This Article seeks to advance a systematic framework for the analysis of social 
norms and the law. As we shall see, insightful theories abound. What we lack is a 
framework with which to derive testable hypotheses about fundamental social factors 
that could support law-related social norms. Toward this end, this Article outlines a 
model of social norms that relies on the theory of value dimensions in cross-cultural 
psychology—a discipline heretofore untapped by legal scholars. The psychology of 
values and theories of value dimensions hold a key for understanding social norms as 
they deal directly with conceptions of the desirable (i.e., the normative) and with the 
notion of societal preferences. These theories suggest means for empirical testing and 
verification of social norms theories. By drawing on these theories, this Article goes 
beyond extant law and economics accounts of social norms without merely offering 
“just so stories.”9
Social norms specify behaviors that are seen as desirable or legitimate in the 
shared view of societal members and whose violation elicits at least informal 
disapproval. As conceptions of the desirable, values are closely linked to social 
norms. The myriad concrete social norms in every society constitute an interlinked 
system that can be depicted as a pyramid. In this metaphorical pyramid of social 
norms, societal or cultural10 orientations define the foundations of the pyramid. They 
9 See Jon Elster, Rational Choice History: A Case of Excessive Ambition, 94 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 685 (2000) (criticizing the Analytical Narrative Project, among other things, for relying on “just 
so stories” while failing to account for high level of aggregation and for intentions and beliefs). See
ROBERT H. BATES ET AL., ANALYTIC NARRATIVES (1998). For a rejoinder to Elster’s critique, see
Robert H. Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, & Barry Weingast, The Analytic 
Narrative Project, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 696 (2000). A notable exception to the anecdotal character of 
many legal accounts is Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (2003) (using survey data to statistically 
analyze attitudes toward gun-control laws).
10
 Social scientists consider society as a system of relationships that connects individuals who 
share the same culture. Society and culture thus constitute one another. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, 
5represent societal preferences for the best ways to respond to the basic challenges that 
every society faces. These responses translate into societal emphases on particular 
values. Basic social norms specify the behaviors that are needed in order to promote 
cherished societal values or prevent violation of those values. Concrete social norms 
apply basic norms to the many situations in life where specific behaviors may 
promote or violate values. Thus cultural orientations constitute the lower strata of the 
pyramid and concrete social norms are found at higher strata.
Interest in social norms among lawyers is especially keen because they shed 
light on the role of the legal system in establishing social order. As already hinted, 
several commentators have argued that in addition to the traditional regulative role, 
the law can have an expressive role in that it could trigger beneficial social norms that 
do not rely on state enforcement.11 This Article argues that the interface between the 
informal social norm system and the formal legal norm system is a rule-of-law social 
norm—a norm that calls on people to prefer legal rules over tradition, elderly people’s 
advice, or superiors’ command when seeking guidance about the right behavior. As 
such, the rule-of-law norm is consistent with cultural values of individual autonomy 
and egalitarianism; it is less nconsistent with cultural views of the individual as an 
embedded entity and with societal preferences for hierarchical ordering.
People in societies that exhibit the former preferences are more likely also to 
consider as persuasive the statement ‘it’s the law.’ Such societal preferences support 
voluntary compliance with the law. People in other societies, however, may respond 
MITCHELL DUNEIER, & RICHARD APPLEBAUM, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY ch. 3 (2d ed. 1996). This 
Article therefore uses the adjectives “societal” and “cultural” interchangeably to denote elements that 
belong to the societal level of analysis as opposed to the individual level of analysis. See below, text to 
note 79 et seq.
6to this statement with a shrug or even resent it. The pyramidal model presented here 
implies that social norms that share with the rule of law a compatibility with 
underlying cultural values—such as societal condemnation of corruption—will 
exhibit similar levels of prevalence in societies that uphold the rule of law because of 
that. It follows that policy makers who plan to rely on legal reform as a vehicle for 
social change—among other things, through triggering beneficial social norms—may 
turn to the present framework as a means for assessing the social environment to 
which such reform is targeted. Environments of this sort include both developing 
countries that receive foreign aid as well as domestic social sub-groups, such as 
immigrants or special communities.
Part II reviews different approaches to social norms. Part III briefly describes 
basic concepts of value dimension theory. Part IV outlines the notional model of the 
pyramid of social norms and demonstrates its contribution to current debates over 
emergence and evolution of social norms. Part V considers the relations between 
social norms and the law, defines the category of norms of governance, and discusses 
the rule of law as a prominent norm in this category. Part VI concludes.
II. APPROACHES TO SOCIAL NORMS
A. Foreword
Notwithstanding the growing interest in social norms, the scholarly debate on 
the subject is in a state of flux. Indeed, the definitions offered for social norms are so 
numerous that the situation had been likened to the Tower of Babel. Dean Scott thus 
noted that
11 See below, text to note 151 et seq.
7“the academic debate currently suffers from conceptual pluralism and 
terminological disarray. Indeed, we lack even a basic consensus on the proper 
definition of a social norm. This tower of Babel quality is, in part, a reflection of the 
complexity of the social phenomena that we are seeking to understand.”12
Several social sciences consider social norms and culture in general as their 
business. Sociology and anthropology in particular have developed approaches for 
social analysis that differ markedly from the approaches on which this Article draws. 
It should thus be stressed from the outset that this Article does not claim that the value 
dimension framework that stands at the heart of this Article is generally superior to 
other methods of social analysis. Nor does this Article purport to provide a 
comprehensive critique of all major approaches to culture and social norms – a feat 
well beyond the present scope.13
What this Article does claim, however, is that the framework presented here is
especially appropriate for enriching the legal literature that has been mostly 
influenced by economic analyses. The following paragraphs provide a thumbnail 
review of central approaches to social norms in economics, social psychology, and 
law and economics as a necessary background for understanding this concept and the 
gaps in our knowledge about it.
12
 Scott, supra note 7, at 1607.
13 See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES: SELECTED ARTICLES 26-
28 (1973) (advocating the study of cultures through “thick description”). Geertz’s symbolic 
anthropology in turn does not represent all current approaches in anthropology since anthropologists 
have never agreed on the definition for culture. Similarly, iconic sociologists such as Emile Durkheim, 
Talcot Parsosn, Robert Merton, and James Coleman, to name just a few, have addressed social norms 
and deviant behavior. See, generally, EMILE DURKHEIM,. THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD, 
(1964 [1895] George E.G. Catlin Ed., Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller Trans.); TALCOTT 
PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); ROBERT K. MERTON, CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION (1961); 
JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990). 
8B. Economic Accounts
Several economists and other social scientists have tried their hand in 
proposing a definition for social norms. Prominent commentators include Robert 
Axelrod,14 Robert Sugden,15 and Jon Elster,16 among others. But as Kaushik Basu 
critically notes, “[m]ost existing definitions are suggestive rather than exact.”17 Basu 
goes on to offer a classification of social norms into ‘rationality-limiting norms,’ 
‘preference-changing norms,’ and ‘equilibrium-selection norms.’18 Yet it is unclear 
whether these categories are mutually-exclusive or exhaustive of the social norm 
concept. 
Economists in general find difficulty in analyzing precisely the type of norms 
that interest lawyers most—namely, norms that call for compliance with costly 
behavioral injunctions when legal enforcement is not forthcoming. In such cases, the 
cost side of the individual’s calculus is simply missing. There is no reliable source of 
deterrence that might induce costly compliance out of fear of yet more costly 
punishment. In particular, a naked view of self-interested behavior makes it difficult 
to formalize individuals’ other-regarding preferences—that is, preference that in some 
way consider the interests of other people (beyond close kin) as part of one’s own 
preferences.
14
 Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986).
15
 Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 85 (1989).
16 JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY (1989); Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic 
Theory, 3 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 99 (1989).
17
 Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 476, 476 (Peter Newman ed. 1998).
18 Id., id. 
9Jean Tirole thus reasons that the main challenge to economic modeling of 
norms is that unlike conventions, norm behavior need not be in one’s self-interest.19
Within the conventional framework, Douglas Bernheim advances a model of 
conformity in which individuals conform to a single standard of behavior despite 
heterogeneous underlying preferences.20 In this model, people are willing to conform 
because they recognize that even small departures from the social norm will seriously 
impair their status.21 Jonathan Bendor and Dilip Mookherjee, however, point to the 
role third-party sanctions may play in promoting compliance with social norms.22
Whether individuals do in fact behave in other-regarding manners is no longer 
in dispute. A constantly growing body of behavioral research looks at people’s 
behavior in social dilemma games. In such games subjects have to weigh their self-
interest, usually expressed in some monetary payoff, against the interest of other 
players. It is now well established that in seeming contradiction to predictions of neo-
19 See Jean Tirole, A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of 
Corruption and to Firm Quality), 63 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 4 (1996). According to Basu, id., at 477, “a 
person endowed with rationality-limiting norms may forego options which could have enhanced his 
utility and thus such a person would be considered irrational in terms of mainstream economics.” 
“Utility” here probably stands for economic welfare. In contrast, “equilibrium-selection norms” are  
fully compatible with self-interested behavior. Sometimes described as behavior rules for 
“coordination” or “Battle of the Sexes” games. Basu notes that “[t]his is the norm the study of which is 
currently in vogue in economics and has generated a lot of literature, to the extent that economists tend 
to forget about the other kinds of norms--conveniently so, since the equilibrium-selection norm is the 
one which is most compatible with conventional economics.” Id. See also Robert Sugden, Normative 
Expectations: The Simultaneous Evolution of Institutions and Norms, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND 
ORGANIZATIONS 73, 73-74 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds. 1998) (making similar 
distinctions).
20
 B. Douglas Bernheim, A Theory of Conformity, 102 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1994). For models 
in a similar spirit see also Sugden, supra note 19; Martin Dufwenberg & Michael Lundholm, Social 
Norms and Moral Hazard, 111 ECON. J. 506 (2001); Assar Lindbeck et al., Social Norms and 
Economic Incentives in the Welfare State, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1997).
21
 Sushil Bikhchadani, David Hirschleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, 
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992) also advance a model 
of conformity. Their model, and others like it, rely on rational self interest driven by informational 
cascades. 
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classical economic theory, subjects quite often behave in ways that appear altruistic: 
They would reciprocate or sacrifice self-reward to achieve an outcome that benefits 
others, or in ways that appear compatible with an abstract ethical principle (e.g., 
fairness or equity).23 Formal modeling of other-regarding preferences at the individual 
level is nascent and remains partial at this stage. Several authors have modeled 
reciprocity.24 More intriguing, however, are models that seek to incorporate elements 
reflecting ethical principles such as equity25 or general benevolence (i.e., seeking to 
increase general social welfare).26
In trying to understand why people adhere to norms, David Kreps 
distinguishes between intrinsic motivations and extrinsic incentives as potential 
factors giving rise to social norms.27 Game theorist Ken Binmore considers other-
regarding preferences (in particular, Rawlsian-type fairness preferences) “held by 
individuals in a particular society as an artefact of their upbringing.”28 Binmore 
surmises that children acquire such preferences unconsciously and later use a distilled 
22 See Jonathan Bendor & Dilip Mookherjee, Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and Cooperation,
6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 33 (1990).
23
 As noted in the text, this is the subject of a burgeoning literature. For a review see, e.g., 
Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on 
Competition, Cooperation and Incentives, 112 ECON. J. C1 (2002); see also Robyn M. Dawes & 
Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187 (1988); David Sally, Conversation and 
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY 
& SOC'Y 58 (1995).
24 See, e.g., Dufwenberg & Lundholm, supra note 20; Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness 
into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281 (1993); Gary Charness & Matthew 
Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, 117 Q. J. Econ. 817 (2002).
25 See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation, 
114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999).
26 See Charness & Rabin, supra note 24.
27
 David M. Kreps, Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 359 
(1997); see also Assar Lindbeck, Incentives and Social Norms in Household Behavior, 87 AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 370 (1997) (arguing that not only economic incentives but also social 
norms may be analyzed by means of utility theory).
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version of this “preference-belief model” as yardsticks for assessing future 
situations.29
Economic modeling of social norms—as opposed to individual-level other-
regarding behavior—involves considerable difficulties. Social norms imply societal 
preferences.30 But the notion of societal preferences31 is hard to grapple with in neo-
classical economics ever since Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow expounded his 
impossibility theorem.32 Arrow’s theorem puts a hurdle on the way to aggregating 
individual preferences into coherent societal ones.33 Often cited in connection with 
voting system design, Arrow's theorem says that any rule of aggregation has to violate 
some conditions that are fundamentally important from the normative point of view.34
Some scholars, like Nobel laureate James Buchanan, consider this hurdle 
28
 Ken Binmore, A Utilitarian Theory of Political Legitimacy, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND 
ORGANIZATION 101, 114 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, eds. 1998).
29 Id., id.
30
 That is, non-trivial social norms do so, unlike norms that only entail selection of one mode 
of action from a menu of equivalent ones—the category that Basu calls equilibrium-selection norms 
and are also known as “coordination games.”
31
 Many economic discussions confusingly employ “social preferences” to denote “other-
regarding preferences.” This usage intermixes preferences of individuals with regard to other members 
of society with preferences of social groups. At the following discussion clarifies, the latter type of 
preferences is highly problematic from an economic perspective if not utterly denied. Yet this is not the 
case from the perspective of psychology or other social sciences even if one prefers not to ascribe 
faculties of choice, tastes, and preferences to social groups.
32 KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951, revised ed. 1963). 
33
 To illustrate the outcome of Arrow’s theorem, without elaboration of its conditions, 
consider the following setting, also known as Condorcet’s paradox: Three individuals, A, B, and C, 
need to choose one out of three alternatives, x, y and z. Suppose individual A prefers x to y to z, 
individual B prefers y to z to x, and individual C prefers z to x to y. Under the standard majority rule, 
there are majorities of two out of three for x against y, for y against z, and for z against x – in other 
words, a cycle. This cyclic outcome implies that the group cannot make a coherent collective (social) 
choice.
34
 Arrow’s theorem has spawned a large literature, that on the one hand generalized its result 
and on the other hand pointed out the extent to which this result hinges on these minimal conditions. 
For a short discussion, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Arrow’s Theorem, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 124 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman Eds. 1987).
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insurmountable.35 The work of yet another Nobel laureate, Amartya Sen, formally 
deals with the necessity to “bring in something outside individual choice behavior in 
order to determine whether a particular behavior pattern is or is not consistent.”36 Sen 
notes in this regard that “we [economists] cannot easily invoke some immediate 
notion of society’s ‘preferences’, or some transparent properties of ‘social 
utility’…”37
Shira Lewin traces this problem, which she dubs “Sen’s paradox,” to the 
historical roots of the relations between economics and psychology during the last 
century.38 More generally, there is now a growing awareness among economists that 
modeling individual behavior must incorporate psychological insights (as attested by 
the awarding of the Nobel Prize in economics to psychologist Daniel Kahneman). 
Efforts toward this end have by and large concentrated in integrating cognitive biases 
into individual utility functions.39 But as was just noted, an additional degree of 
complexity lies in the move from the individual to the societal level. In an excellent 
discussion of endogenous preferences and cultural values, Samuel Bowles argues, 
inter alia, that “preferences go considerably beyond tastes, as an adequate account of 
35
 James Buchanan, A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory, 65 AM. ECON. 
REV. 225 (1975) (discussing Arrow’s Nobel Prize lecture, arguing that it is not possible to cross the 
bridge from individual preferences). For further general analyses, see DENNIS MUELER, PUBLIC CHOICE 
II (1989); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORMS 
IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (1991).
36
 Amartya Sen, Internal Consistency of Choice, 61 ECONOMETRICA 495, 498 (1993). See also 




 Shira B. Lewin, Economic and Psychology: Lessons from Our Own Day from the Early 
Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1293 (1996).
39
 For an influential review, see Mathew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 
11, 13-17 (1998). See, relatedly, Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from 
Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 402 (2002).
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individual actions would have to include values” and that “the more important effects 
of economic organization on preferences operate through cultural transmission.”40
Economic analyses of culture tend to focus on mechanical aspects of this 
concept—mainly possible mechanisms for dissemination of behavioral regularities.41
When it comes to substantive analysis, certain economists use some of the terms 
mentioned below to describe cultures such as individualism, collectivism, or 
egalitarianism.42 Yet because of Sen’s paradox, what these researchers usually 
consider (formally) as cultural beliefs or values are actually individual-level other-
regarding ones. With few exceptions the societal level of analysis is simply ignored.43
C. Social Psychology
Defining social norms in social psychology does not raise difficulties 
reminiscent of those we encounter in economics. Quite naturally, social psychologists 
have been studying social norms for a long time.  Social psychologists consider social 
40
 Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and 
other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 78-79 (1998). For an effort to incorporate personal 
tastes into personal utility functions, see GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996).
41 See, e.g., Guido Cozzi, Culture as a Bubble, 106 J. P OL. ECON. 376 (1998); Sushil 
Bikhchadani, David Hirschleifer, & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and 
Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623 (1998). “Corporate 
culture” is yet a different issue not dealt with in the present study.
42 See, respectively, Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A 
Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON. 912 
(1994); Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray, A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints, 
57 ECONOMETRICA 615-35 (1989). See, in relation to Grief’s article, Robert Cooter & Janet Landa, 
Personal versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and the Law of Contracts, 4 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1984). 
43 See Elster, supra note 9. The first, and so far sole, effort to formally modeling Hofstede’s 
dimensions appear to be Pieter H.M. Ruys, Rene van den Brink, and Radislav Semenov, Values and 
Governance Systems (working paper 2000) (on file with author) and Rene van den Brink, Pieter H.M. 
Ruys, & Radislav Semenov, Governance of Clubs and Firms with Cultural Dimensions (working paper 
2001) (on file with author).
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norms as understood rules for accepted and expected behavior.44 Muzafir Sherif’s 
work on conformity is often cited as an early demonstration of the potency of social 
pressure to engender conformity.45 Subsequent seminal works, e.g., by Solomon 
Asch46 and Stanley Milgram,47 further established that individual behavior varies 
considerably in response to social norms.
Contemporary analyses distinguish between two major categories of norms: 
descriptive norms, which describe what most others do in a situation, and injunctive 
norms, which describe what most others approve or disapprove the re.48 A series of 
studies on littering in public places conducted by Cialdini, Reno, and Kallgren has 
demonstrated the power of injunctive norms to affect individual behavior.49
Psychologists have suggested different sources for social norms, varying from general 
societal expectations for one’s behavior to one’s own expectations for one’s 
behavior.50 Little emphasis has been put until recently on structural linkages among 
particular social norms.
D. Law and Economics
44 DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1999). 
45
 Muzafir Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes, 1 SCOIOMETRY 90 
(1937).
46
 Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of 
Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP, AND MEN 177 (Harold Guetzkow Ed. 1951).
47 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974).
48
 Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social influence: Social norms, conformity and 
compliance, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 151 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. Eds. 4th
ed. 1998); see also Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 1056 (1996) 
(“Social norms can be defined as shared perceptions of appropriate behavior that possess the power to 
induce people to act publicly in ways that deviate from their private inclinations.”)
49 See cites, supra note 5. 
50 See, respectively, Albert Pepitone, Toward a Normative and Comparative Biocultural 
Social Psychology, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 641 (1976); Shalom H. Schwartz, 
Normative Influence on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221-79 (L. 
Berkowitz ed. 1977). For a review see Cialdini and Trost, supra note 48.
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Turning to the legal academia, law and economics scholars of different 
persuasions appear to dominate the contemporary study of social norms here. The 
inception of this branch of scholarship is often attributed to Ellickson’s study of 
Shasta County ranchers.51 The years since the publication of Ellickson’s book have 
witnessed an outpouring of writing on this subject, which yielded many important 
insights but also engendered several principled debates.52 Students of social norms in 
law and economics mainly focus on injunctive norms. Instead of defining social 
norms or their content in the abstract, these scholars tend to specify the mechanism 
that engenders norms and sustains them.
One can distinguish two major lines of thought in social norm analyses—
namely, the internal versus the external approaches to social norms.53 The key 
difference between these approaches is the identity, or location, of the factor that 
induces compliance with a norm. According to the internal approach, this factor lies 
within the individual person. Depending on the situation, one feels compelled to obey 
51 ELLICKSON, supra note 3. 
52
 It is not the purpose of this Article fully to survey the law and economics literature on social 
norms and any partial list of references would do injustice to numerous contributions. With this caveat 
in mind, see, for instance, Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 
(1998); Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 537 
(1998); Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609 
(1998); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181 (1996); Richard 
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); ERIC 
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An 
Economic Approach, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 365 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social 
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (hereinafter Social Roles); Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra 
note 7. See also Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 L. & SOC'Y 
REV. 157 (2000); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177 (1999).  
Additional sources are cited infra at note 56 et seq.
53
 Several writers make distinctions in this spirit, using a similar though not identical 
terminology. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1129-30 
(2000); Etzioni, id, at 161-65.
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a norm due to guilt or pride,54 namely, a “warm glow” for doing the right thing. 
According to the external approach, people comply with social norms due to non-
governmental enforcement and in light of a cost/benefit calculation of sorts.55
Roughly speaking, the internal approach is more receptive to motivations that are not 
strictly wealth maximizing and to psychological insights in general. In contrast, the 
external approach tends to distance itself from such motivations as a necessary
element for understanding social norms.
Robert Cooter is the main exponent of the internal viewpoint. In a long line of 
research he developed an internalization theory of social norms.56 In Cooter’s view, 
people obey and enforce a norm because they internalize its normative element – the 
“ought statement” it implies – such that this element becomes part of their 
preferences. Thus, “a person will pay a net price to uphold an internal obligation.”57
Kaplow and Shavell examine how moral sanctions and rewards, notably moral 
sentiments involving feelings of guilt and virtue, may govern individuals’ behavior.58
Although their model focuses on moral injunctions rather than social norms in 
54 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, id., at 1130.
55 Id., at 1129-30.
56 See Cooter, supra note 52, at 586 -89. See also Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudication 
and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 215 (1994); 
Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unified Social Theory, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 50 (1995); Robert D. Cooter, 
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating The New Law 
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996) (hereinafter Decentralized Law); Robert D. Cooter, 
Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947 (1997) (hereinafter Normative Failure); 
Robert D. Cooter, Models of Morality in Law and Economics: Self-Control and Self-Improvement for 
the "Bad Man" of Holmes, 78 B.U. L. REV. 903 (1998); Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social 
Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000); Robert Cooter, 
Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1577 (2000).
57
 Cooter, supra note 52, at 588 (italics in the original).
58
 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Moral Rules and the Moral Sentiments: Toward a Theory 
of an Optimal Moral System, working paper (2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=293906.
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general,59 it sheds light on the mechanism that may be involved in creating internal 
obligations as it distinguishes between economic utility and moral utility. Beyond law 
and economics stricto sensu, Amitai Etzioni holds that “social norms are not merely 
part of the actors’ environment but also affect their intrinsic predispositions…These 
predispositions reflect a combination of people’s biological urges and their cultural 
imprinting.”60
Among the scholars that adopt an internal approach to social norms, Cooter is 
the most explicit in drawing on psychological theories to explain how people may 
internalize normative obligations. Cooter cites theories on internalization of morality 
during early childhood development advanced by such iconic psychologists as Jean 
Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Sigmund Freud.61 Some of the ideas expressed by
Kohlberg have been criticized in light of feminist theories.62 Many modern 
psychologists likewise may object to taking Freud at face value. Nevertheless, the 
common assumption is that children acquire value preferences at a young age.63
Finally, Lior Strahilevitz recently argued that social norms of reciprocity in loose-knit 
groups, which he identifies among Internet users (e.g., of music file sharing), can be 
59
 The difference between “moral injunctions” and “social norms” implied in the text may be 
subtle. As used by Kaplow and Shavell, and perhaps other writers, the notion of moral injunctions has a 
clear deontological dimension – having to do with the good or the bad per se. Social norms prescribe 
behavior rules that oftentimes may difficult to pigeonhole into such restrictive categories 
notwithstanding the fact that social norms too reflect what the surrounding society considers as 
desirable.
60
 Etzioni, supra note 52, at 161.
61
 Cooter makes these references repeatedly. See, e.g., Cooter, Decentralized Law, supra note 
56, at 1661-62; Cooter, Normative Failure, supra note 56, at 965 (citing JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL 
JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 13-108 (Marjorie Gabain trans., 1965); Lawrence Kohlberg, The Philosophy 
of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice, in 1 ARTICLES ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT
1, 409-12 (1981); SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID 18-29 (James Strachey ed. & Joan Riviere 
trans. 1962)).
62 See Cooter, id., at 1661n54. Etzioni is even more critical of Kohlberg’s work. See Etzioni, 
supra note 52, at 168-69.
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explained by psychological theories on internalized motivations for general, open-
ended reciprocity.64
Many social norms theorists in the legal academia, however, subscribe to 
different versions of the external approach, relying upon rational choice theory and 
game theory.65 Members of this camp generally argue that social norms can be 
explained without reliance on psychological theories on non-selfish motivations. To 
various degrees, these commentators aver that self-interestedness, when properly 
considered, can provide sufficient basis for the emergence and maintenance of social 
norms. Thus, Eric Posner’s prolific writing expounds a signaling model in which 
people comply with and enforce norms with a view toward future exchanges,66 and 
Cass Sunstein perceives norms as “part of the background against which costs and 
benefits are assessed”.67 Ellickson defines social norms as rules “governing an 
individual’s behavior that third parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by 
means of social sanctions”,68 and Lawrence Lessig espouses a similar view.69 In a 
63 See below note 140.
64 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (citing Sally Ann Shumaker 
& James S. Jackson, The Aversive Effects of Nonreciprocated Benefits, 42 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 148 
(1979)). Strahilevitz also provides a survey of related research that has investigated whether the 
motivation for such generalized reciprocity is conditioned on having first being helped and what may 
be mechanisms that trigger such reciprocity norms. Strahilevitz, id., at 563-564. See also 
65 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Limits of Social Norms, 75 CHIC.-KENT L. REV. 1537, 1540 
(2000). Scholars in this camp thus follow the more traditional line in economics surveyed above.
66 See E. POSNER, supra note 52; See also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The 
Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV 133 (1996); Eric A. 
Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998) 
(herrinafter Symbols, Signals); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 
86 VA. L. REV 1781 (2000).
67 See Sunstein, Expressive Function,  supra note 52, at 935.
68
 Ellickson, supra note 7, at 3. See also Richard A. Posner & Eric Bennett Rasmusen, 
Creating and Enforcing Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
(1999).
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middle ground between the internal and external views, Richard McAdams advances 
an exchange-based model of social norms in which the currency is psychic: People 
comply with social norms because they seek other people’s esteem (as a positive 
payoff) and try to avoid their opprobrium (as a negative payoff).70
E. Interim Summary
As should be clear from the foregoing brief review, there are lively debates in 
several social sciences on the nature of social norms, the factors that engender them, 
and on the very definition of social norms. In a recent volume on this subject Michael 
Hechter and Karl-Dieter Opp indeed note:
“As there is no common definition of social norms, there can be little agreement 
about how to measure them… Much less clear, however, are the conditions responsible for 
their emergence.”71
That said, readers may also have noticed certain common threads running 
across these debates even in the present limited scope. In virtually every discussion 
there are interesting and uninteresting norms. Plain behavioral regularities—
particularly those that resolve coordination problems by pointing out a focal point and 
are therefore in everybody’s interest—belong to the uninteresting kind. Compliance 
with this type of social norms does not convey meaning. These norms will not occupy 
us beyond this point. In contrast, the interesting kind of social norms are those that 
69 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1044 
(1995) (arguing that social norms rely upon “social meanings [that] impose costs, and supply benefits, 
to individuals and groups”); Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 
(1998) (arguing that social norms “constrain [people] because of the enforcement of a community).
70 See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 52, at 355-57. For similar approaches see below, text to 
note 102 et seq.
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call for explanation—the norms that are not ostensibly in people’s direct material 
interest. Here the challenge is to provide an analytical framework that would link 
social norms with other social phenomena without resorting to tautologies or 
idiosyncratic “thick descriptions.” Accounts of this sort, while intriguing, are 
susceptible to the critique that they are at bottom only “just so stories.”72
In order to pin down the notion of social norms, at least partially, this Article 
adopts the definition used in social psychology for injunctive norms, namely, 
behavioral rules that describe what most people approve or disapprove in a situation. 
Thus, a behavioral pattern X would be a social norm if most people approve of it. We 
would say that the social norm X prevails in a society if most people approve of the 
behavioral pattern X and actually comply with this pattern X most of the time. The 
crucial element is the injunctive feature of the norm – the command, or the belief that 
doing X is right, appropriate, or desirable. This belief is injunctive, or normative, 
because it is shared by most people. The injunctive element captures the fact that 
compliance with the norm is not trivial as it does not reflect direct self-interestedness.
III. THEORIES OF VALUE DIMENSIONS
A. Foreword
The study of values in cross-cultural psychology has made significant progress 
in tackling the very issue that lies at the heart of social norm analysis—namely, the 
71
 Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, Introduction, in SOCIAL NORMS xiii (Michael Hechter 
& Karl-Dieter Opp eds. 2001).
72 See Elster, supra note 9; see also Hechter and Opp, supra note 71, at xix (“Jon Elster… 
argues that the regulatory power of norms is fundamentally emotional. Consequently, the best evidence 
about emotions, he claims, is to be found in works of history, anthropology, fiction, and philosophy. It 
is doubtful, however, that these sources of evidence can contribute much to an analysis of social norms. 
More likely, the kinds of evidence that can be garnered from anthropologists’ and novelists’ thick 
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nature and structure of societal preferences. In cross-cultural psychology, societal 
preferences are assumed but not assumed away. They are given content, context, and 
structure. Equally importantly, by drawing on the concept of values, current theories 
in this discipline are able to connect individual-level motivations with societal- level 
orientations and suggest means with which to measure them. This part provides a 
brief introduction to the basic concepts used in cross-cultural psychology while 
eschewing any attempt to cover the entire field in the present scope.73
This part outlines theories of value dimensions advanced by two leading cross-
cultural psychologists, Geert Hofstede and Shalom Schwartz, as a basis for discussion 
in subsequent sections.74 Regrettably, the legal literature is virtually unaware of this 
body of knowledge.75 Economists too are largely oblivious to this discipline although 
interest in modeling culture is emerging.76 Other disciplines, however, make extensive 
description lead to the “just-so stories” that Elster so frequently disparages in many of his other 
writings.”)
73
 This Part draws on Shalom H. Schwartz, Cultural Value Differences: Some Implications for 
Work, 48 APPL’D PSYCHOL. INT’L REV. 23 (1999) and on AMIR N. LICHT, CHANAN GOLDSCHMIDT, & 
SHALOM H. SCHWARTZ, CULTURE RULES: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE RULE OF LAW AND OTHER 
NORMS OF GOVERNANCE (working paper 2003). For a more detailed review of these issues and other 
aspects of cross-cultural psychology see Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward 
a Cross-Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DELAWARE J. CORP. L. 147, 166-80 
(2001); see also Peter B. Smith & Shalom H. Schwartz, Values, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 70, 77-79 (2nd ed., J.W. Berry et al., eds 1997); PETER B. SMITH & MICHAEL H. BOND, 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ACROSS CULTURES: ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVES 38-69 (2nd ed. 1998); 
Michael Harris Bond & Peter B. Smith, Cross-Cultural Social and Organizational Psychology, 47 
ANNU. REV. PSYCHOL. 205 (1996).
74
 For other analyses, see, e.g., RONALD INGLEHART, MODERNIZATION AND 
POSTMODERNIZATION: CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN 43 COUNTRIES; Peter B. 
Smith, Shaun Dugan, & Fons Trompenaars, National Culture and the Values of Organizational 
Employees: A Dimensional Analysis Across 43 Nations , 27 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 231 
(1996); Chinese Cultural Connection, Chinese Values and the Search for Culture-Free Dimensions of 
Culture, 18 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 143 (1987).
75 See Licht, supra note 73, at 180 (reporting that Lexis and WestLaw searches on legal 
literature retrieved only a handful of references to Hofstede’s work and no reference to Shalom 
Schwartz’s studies).
76 See supra text to note 41 et seq.
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use of these theories. Hofstede’s theory in particular dominates analyses in 
management studies77 and international accounting.78
B. Values
The core concept in the present discussion is values. Values are defined as 
conceptions of the desirable.79 Values thus feature at the two distinct levels of 
analysis: the individual and the societal (or cultural). For purposes of social norm 
analysis the latter level is the relevant one. We are interested in preferences, 
emphases, and orientations that are shared by the societal group as a whole, at least on 
average, and how they interact with the social institution which is the law. 
Unfortunately, the recent advents in the economic analysis of other-regarding 
preferences at the individual level, awkwardly dubbed “social preferences,” tend to 
confuse these two levels of analysis. Many analyses of social norms share this 
confusion. This calls for briefly mentioning the role of values at the individual level in 
order to clarify the differences in the issues addressed at the two levels. 
77 See, e.g., STEPHEN P. ROBBINS & MARY COULTER, MANAGEMENT 125-29 (6th ed 1999) 
(arguing that “[t]he most valuable framework to help managers better understand differences between 
national cultures was developed by Geert Hofstede.”) See, generally, Richard Mead, International 
Management: Cross-Cultural Dimensions (2nd ed. 1998) (drawing on Hofstede’s theory); Greame 
Harrison & Jill L. McKinnon, Cross-Cultural Research in Management Control System Design: A 
Review of the Current State, 24 ACTG ORG. & SOC. 483 (1998) (same).
78
 The now classic work, implementing Hofstede’s framework, is Sidney J. Gray, Towards a 
Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems Internationally, 24 ABACUS 1 
(1988). For a review, see Helen Gernon & R.S. Olusegun Wallace, International Accounting Research: 
A Review of its Ecology, Contending Theories, and Methodologies, 14 J. ACCT. LIT. 54, 86-91 (1995). 
See also GERHARD G. MUELLER, HELEN GERNON, AND GARY K. MEEK, ACCOUNTING: AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 10-11 (4th ed. 1997); Harry H.E. Fechner & Alan Kilgore, The Influence 
of Cultural Factors on Accounting Practice, 29 INT’L J. ACTG 265 (1994). For an empirical analysis of 
Gray’s theory see Stephen B. Salter & Frederick Niswander, Cultural Influence on the Development of 
Accounting Systems Internationally:  A Test of Gray’s (1988) Theory, 26 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 379 
(1995).
79 See, generally, Clyde Kluckhohn, Value and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action, in 
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 383 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils, eds. 1951); MILTON 
ROKEACH, THE NATURE OF HUMAN VALUES (1973); Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and 
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For individual persons, values represent motivational goals. This is the view of 
values as guiding principles in one’s life. As beliefs, values are not objective, cold 
ideas. Rather, when values are activated (at the individual level), they become infused 
with feeling. Behavior in compliance the values endorsed by an individual person 
would elicit a sense of virtue; deviant behavior would elicit a sense of guilt. 
Examination of internal relationships between numerous specific values reveals that 
they in fact represent ten basic value-types. (Specifically: power, achievement, 
hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, conformity, 
tradition, and security.) These value types can further be organized along two bipolar 
dimensions: self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and.80
Future research should consider the relations between the two individual-level 
dimensions and what economists call other-regarding preferences. In brief, it appears 
that the latter dimension (conservation versus openness to change) has thus far gone 
largely unnoticed. As this Article concentrates on the societal level of analysis a 
comprehensive discussion of values at the individual level exceeds the present 
scope.81
Moving now to the cultural level of analysis, let us first note that definitions of 
culture abound. Social scientists often define culture in subjective terms as the values, 
Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (M. Zanna ed. 1992).
80 Shalom H. Schwartz, Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances 
and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries, in 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (M. 
Zanna Ed. 1992) (presenting model). See also Shalom H. Schwartz & Anat Bardi, Value Hierarchies 
across Nations: Taking a Similarities Perspective, 31 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2000).
81
 For an application of individual-level value dimensions to corporate governance analysis 
see Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values and Cognitive Style 
(ECGI Law Working Paper No. 16/2003 2003), available online at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=469801.
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orientations and underlying assumptions that are prevalent among the members of a 
society.82 Values are the essence of culture seen this way. The values that constitute a 
culture are the implicitly or explicitly shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, 
and desirable in a society.83  These cultural values (e.g., freedom, prosperity, security) 
are the bases for the specific norms that tell people what is appropriate in various
situations. 
The ways that societal institutions (e.g., the family, education, economic, 
political, religious systems) function, their goals and their modes of operation, express 
cultural value priorities. Because cultural value priorities are shared, role incumbents 
in social institutions (e.g., leaders in governments, teachers in schools, executive 
officers of corporations) can draw upon them to select socially appropriate behavior 
and to justify their behavioral choices to others (e.g., to go to war, to punish a child, to 
fire employees). The explicit and implicit value emphases that characterize a culture 
are imparted to societal members through everyday exposure to customs, laws, norms, 
scripts, and organizational practices that are shaped by and express the prevailing 
cultural values.84 Thus, adaptation to social reality and informal socialization are just 
as central to the transmission of cultural values as is formal socialization.
C. Dimensions of Culture
82
 This definition is similar to that adopted in studies of the effects of societal development, 
e.g., CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. 
Huntington, eds., 2000) and widespread in cross-cultural psychology, e.g., HANDBOOK OF CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (J.W. Berry, M.H. Segall & C. Kagitcibasi, eds., 2nd Ed, 1997).
83 See ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN SOCIETY: A SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION (3rd ed. 
1970).
84 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (1972); Hazel R. Markus & 
Shinobu Kitayama, A Collective Fear of the Collective: Implications for Selves and Theories of Selves, 20 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 568 (1994).
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A common postulate in cross-cultural psychology is that all societies confront 
similar basic issues or problems when they come to regulate human activity with a 
view to establishing social order.85 Societal members, especially decision-makers, 
recognize and communicate about these problems, plan responses to them, and motivate 
one another to cooperate in coping with them. They do so by drawing on values. Values 
are the vocabulary of socially approved goals used to motivate action and to express and 
justify the solutions chosen. Because values vary in importance, it is possible to 
characterize each society by the relative importance attributed to these values in the 
society. This cultural-level analysis yields unique cultural profiles.
Schwartz derives three bipolar, cultural value dimensions from three basic issues 
he identifies as confronting all societies. In coping with these issues, societies exhibit 
greater or lesser emphasis on the values at one or the other pole of each dimension. 
Seven types of values (societal orientations) on which cultures can be compared derive 
from the analysis of the bipolar dimensions.  The theory also specifies the structure of 
relations among these types of values. The following paragraphs briefly describe these 
three value dimensions, the seven types of values, and the basic issues to which they 
relate. Figure 1 presents graphically the relations among the value dimensions and value 
types.
[Figure 1 about here]
Embeddedness/Autonomy: This dimension concerns the desirable relationship 
between the individual and the group.  Embeddedness represents a cultural emphasis 
85 See, for instance, ROKEACH, supra note 79; FLORENCE R. KLUCKHOHN & FRED L. 
STRODTBECK, VARIATIONS IN VALUE ORIENTATIONS (1961).
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on the person as embedded in the group and committed to maintaining the status quo, 
propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt group solidarity or 
the traditional order. The opposite pole of Autonomy describes cultures in which the 
person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her 
own uniqueness. It is possible to distinguish conceptually between two types of 
Autonomy.  Intellectual Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of 
individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions 
(curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity).  Affective Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on 
the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience 
(pleasure, exciting life, varied life).
Hierarchy/Egalitarianism: This dimension concerns the desirable ways to 
guarantee responsible behavior that preserves the social fabric. Hierarchy represents a 
cultural emphasis on obeying role obligations within a legitimately unequal 
distribution of power, roles, and resources. Egalitarianism represents an emphasis on 
transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the 
welfare of others whom one sees as moral equals.
Mastery/Harmony: This dimension concerns the relation of humankind to the 
natural and social world. Mastery refers to a cultural emphasis on getting ahead 
through active self-assertion in order to master, change, and exploit the natural and 
social environment. Harmony represents an emphasis on accepting the social and 
physical world as it is, trying to comprehend and fit in rather than to change or 
exploit.
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A pioneering and influential dimensional framework for characterizing culture 
was advanced by Hofstede.86 The following sets forth Hofstede’s value dimensions 
and the basic societal problems they address. Here too, each dimension describes a 
range of possible stances between two polar extremes.
Individualism/Collectivism: This dimension refers to the relationship between 
individual and group. A collectivist orientation values loosely knit social relations in 
which individuals are expected to care only for themselves and their immediate families. 
An individualist orientation values tightly knit relations in which people expect their 
broad in-group (e.g., extended family, clan) to look after them in exchange for 
unquestioning loyalty.
Power Distance: This dimension concerns social inequality, including relations 
with authority. High power distance indicates that an unequal distribution of power in 
institutions is viewed as legitimate.
Uncertainty Avoidance: This dimension concerns cultural preferences for 
dealing with uncertainty. Are uncertainty and ambiguity viewed as disturbing and 
threatening or as acceptable challenges? The more threatening uncertainty is 
perceived to be, the more highly valued are beliefs and institutions that provide 
certainty.
86 See GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN 
WORK-RELATED VALUES (1980, abridged ed. 1984) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980”); 
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed. 2001) (hereinafter “CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES”); GEERT 
H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS: SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (1991) (hereinafter 
“SOFTWARE OF THE MIND”).
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Masculinity/Femininity: This dimension concerns the social implications of 
gender-linked behavior as they are presented in many societies (irrespective of their 
desirability). More “masculine” cultures value achievement, heroism, assertiveness, and 
material success. More “feminine” cultures emphasize relationships, modesty, caring for 
the weak, and interpersonal harmony.87
Long-Term Orientation: This dimension concerns cultural emphases on time 
horizons. High Long-Term Orientation emphasizes Confucian work ethics such as 
thrift and persistence; low Long-Term Orientation reflects greater acceptance of rapid 
changes.88
IV. A PYRAMID OF SOCIAL NORMS
At this point, readers may be able to see how values and cultural value 
dimensions relate to social norms and to the law. These are all social phenomena that 
deal with the “ought”. The cultural profile of each society affects its members’ 
personal values as well as its social institutions. It therefore defines the setting in 
which more concrete norms evolve. This part develops this insight by advancing a 
pyramidal model of social norms that rests on cultural value foundations.
A. Values and Social Norms
87
 Although this label has elicited negative responses, Hofstede argues that it reflects an 
empirical reality of gender differences that is independent of its normative undesirability. In the 2001 
edition of his study, Hofstede follows the modern distinction between sex and gender and uses the 
latter tern when referring to social function. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 86, at 
280. For further discussion, see MASCULINITY AND FEMININITY: THE TABOO DIMENSION OF NATIONAL 
CULTURES (Geert H. Hofstede & Willem A. Arrindell eds. 1998).
88
 This value dimension was not included in Hofstede’s original study. It was added later, in 
HOFSTEDE, SOFTWARE OF THE MIND, supra note 86, in light of a study led by Michael Bond. There, it 
was named “Confucian work dynamism.” See Chinese Cultural Connection, Chinese Values and the 
Search for Culture-Free Dimensions of Culture, 18 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 143 (1987). 
Notwithstanding its apparent link to Asian cultures it is arguably a universal dimension. Data for this 
dimension cover a smaller set of countries and it is not commonly used in the literature.
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Patterns of behavior become (injunctive) social norms when people around the 
actor expect her to follow such patterns and signal their expectations to her, and when 
the actor recognizes these expectations and adjusts her behavior to them. The 
framework that societies use to determine what is expected, desirable, or legitimate 
consists of values. Values, as defined by social psychologists, are therefore 
conceptually close to social norms, as the latter are understood by students of social 
norms in the legal academia. This is not merely a linguistic statement but rather a 
conceptual claim.89 Social norms are “ought statements” and values compactly 
represent what ought to be pursued in a particular social group.90
The conceptualization of values in the value dimension framework integrates 
elements from both the internal and the external approaches to social norms. The 
internal approach assumes that the process of socialization molds societal members’ 
utility functions, as suggested by Bowles, Binmore, and Cooter.91 During this process, 
societal members internalize the choices and preferences that had already been made 
by previous generations as they are reflected in the surrounding culture. Recall that 
when values are activated they become infused with feeling. When people behave in 
89
 Support for the linguistic claim may be found, for instance, in Hofstede’s writings, as he 
repeatedly refers to value dimensions as “societal norms”. Hofstede, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, 
supra note 86, at 97, 159 (referring to Power Distance and to Uncertainty Avoidance, respectively). 
The review in Part 2 indicates that term usage is far from settled, however, such that this reasoning 
cannot be decisive. See, e.g., Michael Hechter, The Role of Values in Rational Choice Theory, 6 
RATIONALITY & SOC'Y 318, 321-22 (1994) (distinguishing between “values”, “preferences”, and 
“norms”).
90
 Cultural values may thus be likened metaphorically to building blocks of a socio-genetic 
code that every modern society carries. In this metaphor, societies share many of these building blocks 
but differ in the relative weight they give to each one, somewhat like species that share many genes but 
differ in the makeup of their genetic codes. Cf. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF 
IDEOLOGY (1998) (asserting a theory of cultural evolution).
91 See Bowles, supra note 40; Binmore supra note 28; Cooter supra note 56. 
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compliance with cultural values it is because they feel they ought to do so. Cultural 
values thus shape and inform people’s internal utility functions. 
The internalization approach suggests that values may be analyzed as 
arguments in people’s utility function. In this view, people constantly assess 
alternative modes of conduct not only in light of corresponding material payoffs but 
also against their internalized set of value preferences. In some cases the material 
incentive, or narrow self-interest, would dominate. In other cases some people may 
consider compliance with other values as more rewarding. Experimental economics—
particularly the research programs led by Frey, Fehr and Rabin—confirms this 
conjecture at least with regard to reciprocity and general fairness.92 One may further 
assume that people’s revealed preferences would reflect their cultural profile. This 
conjecture too receives supported from a large body of empirical evidence.93
The value dimension framework may help in addressing the challenge that Sen 
had pointed out, namely, economists’ current inability to invoke a notion of societal 
preferences or transparent properties of social utility.94 The pivotal element here is the 
distinction between individual and cultural levels of analysis. At the individual level, 
the idea that internalization of social values affects personal utility functions entails 
that societal preferences may be regarded as part of societal members’ self-interest. At 
the cultural level, the same building blocks—namely, the particular value items—may 
serve to identify societal stances toward basic social problems. By postulating cultural 
value dimensions as responses to social problems the value dimension framework 
92 See supra text to note 23.
93 See Smith & Schwartz, supra note 73; HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 
86.
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identifies the parameters of a social utility function. To the extent that individual 
behavior is guided by cultural values such behavior can be assumed to simultaneously 
maximize both personal utility and, consequentially, social utility. To be sure, theories 
of value dimensions cannot resolve the theoretical problem posed by Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem; but they do suggest means for sidestepping the hurdle this 
theorem places on the way to explicating societal preferences.
Recall now Kaplow and Shavell’s model of moral rules and moral 
sentiments.95 Kaplow and Shavell base their model on the assumption that
“[i]ndividuals are subject to a process of inculcation such that they will 
experience guilt or virtue as a function of the choices they make, and, accordingly 
they will be led to behave other than in their narrow self-interest if the weight of guilt 
and virtue exceeds their personal benefit from an act.”96
One can readily recognize that this assumption in fact reflects a restatement of 
the concept of values and in particular, the notion that values are infused with 
feelings, such that choices and actions are also affected by the level of good or bad 
feeling that they entail. In concentrating on moral rules, Kaplow and Shavell 
unnecessarily limit the scope of their model. The set of actions and situations 
involving moral judgments is narrower than the set involving value judgments. On the 
one hand, this limitation makes the model universal in that it refers to acts that are 
“good” or “bad” in the abstract. On the other hand, this feature of the model limits its 
universality with respect to the actual nature of acts that societies perceive as good or 
94
 Sen, supra note 36, at 498.
95
 Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 58.
96 Id., at 3.
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bad. The value dimension framework explicates the notion that relative superiority of 
actions with respect to one another may differ across social groups. Kaplow and 
Shavell indeed acknowledge that “[t]he possibility of inculcation, moreover, is 
important in attempting to explain cross-cultural variation in moral rules.”97
As noted briefly above, the need to account for psychological factors in order 
to sophisticate models of individual rational behavior is no longer contested. This 
enterprise has been largely limited to cognitive bounds that directly affect individual 
decision-making.98 However, as one develops the ability to decide for oneself, one’s 
decision-making mechanism is affected by cultural values just as it is affected by 
cognitive bounds on human memory and computational capability. Integrating the 
value dimension framework into law and economics analysis is therefore a direct 
extension of integrating behavioral economics insights into it – what is now known as 
Behavioral Law and Economics.99  Value dimension theories can advance social 
norms analysis by providing an empirically validated framework with which to 
account for social phenomena that are otherwise difficult to reconcile with standard 
micro-economic predictions. 
The relevance of value dimensions is not limited to internalization-based 
views of human norms. The societal cultural profile also operates as an external 
97 Id., at 27. The difference between individual- and cultural-level organization of values 
entails, however, that aggregation of individual preferences to create a social welfare function may 
involve more than simple mathematical integration.
98 See Rabin, supra note 39; Bowles, supra note 40. 
99 See, generally, Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 53; Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, & 
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); 
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
115 (1999). For a thorough review, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and 
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998).
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mechanism for creation and enforcement of norms, in concurrence with internal 
mechanisms. The crucial element in this context is the nature of value preferences as 
capturing shared meanings and beliefs. Even in the strong formulation of the external 
approach—e.g., as espoused by Eric Posner’s signaling model—societal members 
must have a minimal shared basis of “common knowledge.”100 Such common 
knowledge is necessary for people to be able to generate the right signals and interpret 
signals sent by others. To the extent that individuals have acquired culture, they can 
predict how their actions would likely be perceived by others in their environment, 
such as professional peers, family, the media, and so forth. They can assess whether 
an action is generally considered right or wrong. As certain cultural values take root 
among individual members of society, they shape social institutions and the general 
social environment. This environment gives meaning to action, defines what is 
socially acceptable, and exercises social control through triggering sanctioning. 
Values therefore delineate the constraints for and give meaning to individual 
behavior, as in Lessig’s and Ellickson’s accounts.101
Recently, Fehr and Falk reviewed the psychological foundations of incentives, 
arguing that economists may fail to understand the levels and the changes in behavior 
if they neglect motives like the desire to reciprocate or the desire to avoid social 
disapproval.102 The point is well taken and is also consistent with McAdams’s account 
100
 “Common knowledge” here connotes the game theoretic concept of common knowledge, 
namely, the information that is available to all the players, all the players know that it is available to all 
of them, all the players know that all the players know this, and so forth ad infinitum. See ERIC 
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 44 (1989).
101 Cf. Bond & Smith (1996, p. 209) (adopting a definition of culture as a set of "shared 
constraints that limit the behavior repertoire available to members of a certain . . . group").
102 See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. 
REV. 687 (2002).
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of social norms, under which social approval or disapproval motivates individuals’ 
compliance with norms. These accounts, however, may not fully acknowledge that 
people’s response to (actual and would-be) social approval or disapproval is not 
uniform. Such responses in fact vary systematically with people’s values even within 
societies, as was shown by Philip Tetlock’s work on accountability.103 Similar to 
Kaplow and Shavell’s theory, these insights can be generalized by accounting for 
cross-cultural differences in social stances towards reciprocation, and, more generally 
yet, toward the subject of social approval. Different societies approve of different 
behaviors and these differences are captured in their cultural profile of value 
orientations.
B. Strata of Social Norms
One of the striking features in the extant social norms literature is the equal 
treatment commentators give to norms that are profoundly different in importance and 
prevalence. Conducts like dueling, flag desecration, and racial discrimination are 
considered representative of social norms as are cleaning after one’s dog, smoking in 
public places, or bringing cookies to faculty seminars.104 To be sure, similar incentive 
mechanisms may be at work when such norms exert their influence. But a sound 
103 See Philip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Biases and Organizational Correctives: Do Both Disease 
and Cure Depend on the Ideological Beholder?, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 293 (2001); see, generally, Philip 
E. Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency Model: Identifying Empirical and Normative 
Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-Bias Portrait of Human Nature, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 571 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope, Eds. 1999).
104 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 69, at 682 (dueling); E. Posner, Symbols, Signals, supra note 
66, at 780-81 (flag desecration); Scott, supra note 12, at 1608-09 (“pooper scooper” norms); Ellickson, 
supra note 7 (racial discrimination, smoking, and “pooper-scooper” norms); Cooter, Normative 
Failure, supra note 56, at 977 (smoking in public and “pooper scooper” norms); Mitchell, supra note 
52 (cookies).
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theory of social norms should also be able to distinguish between lighting a cigar in a 
dinner party and burning a cross on an African-American’s front lawn.105
A notional model of a pyramid of social norms that relies on the value 
dimension framework provides means for sensibly making such distinctions. The 
basic idea is rather simple: in every society norms constitute a system – a set of 
interdependent and interacting elements that work together to accomplish specific 
purposes.106 In fact, the system of social norms is a sub-system of social order 
institutions, together with legal norms and other sub-systems. In the system of social 
norms, some norms are central to the social structure and are deeply rooted; others 
may be less so. The perception of social norms as a system implies that norms are 
interrelated and therefore cannot be analyzed solely as isolated objects.
A useful way to describe the interrelation between social norms is to use a 
pyramidal model. Now the metaphor of a pyramid of norms should rightfully be 
attributed to Hans Kelsen. In his Pure Theory of Law,107 Kelsen postulated a multi-
level structure of legal norms in which each layer generates and legitimizes the next. 
The validity of the entire structure emanates from a preexistent basic norm 
(Grundnorm).108 The pyramid of social norms resembles Kelsen’s pyramid in two 
respects: first, it makes explicit the notion that norms constitute a system; second, it 
105 See Ellickson, supra note 7 (using cigar example); Lessig supra note 69, at 684 (using 
cross burning example).
106 See MICHAEL L. GIBSON & CARY T. HUGHES, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND DESIGN 5 (1994). 
For an implementation of a general systems approach to the law, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems 
Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479 (1997). From a positive point of view, the attribution of 
goals to systems is merely shorthand for the proposition that the goals of a system are the results that 
the system in fact produces. Lopucky, id., at 485. For a brief background on general systems theory see
Kathryn R. Heidt, Taking a New Look at Secured Transactions Secured Credit, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 
759, 762-64 (1996).
107 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1942).
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distinguishes between norms according to their importance to the entire system. Like 
Kelsen’s pyramid, the pyramid of social norms actually stands on its head, as its basis 
consists of only a few basic norms.
The pyramid model exhibits structural features that may be described as 
vertical and horizontal. The vertical structure distinguishes different strata, or layers, 
of norms, ranging from fundamental to particular norms. In this respect, the model 
identifies limited sets of core normative inclinations from which societies derive more 
concrete norms.109 Cultural emphases on value types (i.e., poles of value dimensions) 
constitute the fundamental layer of norms in the pyramid. These are the societal first 
principles – the most deep-seated elements of each society’s social order system. 
Thus, a cultural emphasis Autonomy over Embeddedness is a basic social norm; so is 
a cultural preference for Individualism over Collectivism. These norms are manifested 
in societal emphases on particular values. Norms at the deeper strata in turn set the 
stage for the development of more concrete norms in higher strata.
The present pyramidal model of social norms is consistent with a model of 
stratified social institutions advanced by Oliver Williamson.110 Williamson’s model 
108
 For a critical review, see J. W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 73-80 (2nd ed. 1997).
109
 The preeminent political scientist Aaron Wildavsky also pointed out the need to organize 
values along a limited set of dimensions. See Aaron Wildavksy, Choosing Preferences by Constructing 
Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 3, 8 (1987) (“All of us 
in social science are looking for bedrock, for the most basic value and factual premises that we can 
hypothesize as lying behind specific political and policy preferences.”) Relaying on a cultural model 
developed by anthropologist Mary Douglas, Wildavsky also subscribed to a theory of cultural 
dimensions of human relations postulating four models of cultures: Fatalism, Collectivism, 
Individualism, and Egalitarianism. Wildavsky, id, at 6. For an application of Wildavsky’s 
conceptualization to gun control see Kahan & Braman, supra note 9. 
110
 Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 
J. ECON. LIT. 595 (2000).
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distinguishes four levels of analysis. “Level 1” consists of informal institutions.111 This 
is where norms, customs, mores, and traditions are located and where religion plays a 
role. According to Williamson, “Level 1 is taken as given by most institutional 
economists.”112 Level 2, located below Level 1, consists of formal legal rules, 
comprising constitutions, law, property rights, etc.113 Governance structures (e.g., in 
firms) and marginal analysis (e.g., of economic outcomes and prices) belong to Levels 
3 and 4, respectively. Although the system is fully interconnected, feedback among 
levels is neglected. Figure 2 describes graphically these four levels, causal links 
(represented by solid arrows), and feedback links (represented by dashed arrows).
[Figure 2 about here]
In Williamson’s model, higher levels impose constraints on the development of 
the levels immediately below. Williamson postulates that Level 1 informal institutions 
are pervasively linked with complementary institutions, both formal and informal. The 
resulting institutions “have a lasting grip on the way a society conducts itself.”114 One 
can readily acknowledge that the pyramidal model of social norms elaborates 
Williamson’s model as it allows one to look into the “black box” of Level 1 informal 
institutions. The cultural value dimension framework on which the pyramidal model 
111
 Williamson identifies Level 1 with the notion of “embeddedness” proposed by Mark 
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness , 91 A M. J. 
SOCIOL. 481 (1985). Both concepts must not be confused with the cultural orientation of 
Embeddedness.
112
 Williamson, supra note 110, at 596.
113 Douglas North has shown that the definition and enforcement of legal rights are important 
features of this level. See DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); Douglas C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 97 (1991).
114
 Williamson, supra note 110, at 597.
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draws provides concrete content to the structural elements that constitute Level 1 
institutions.
Furthermore, viewing Level 1 informal institutions merely as constraints that 
define transaction costs for alternative institutions does not fully capture their role. 
The prevailing informal institutions in a society (beliefs, norms and values) also serve 
as sources of motivation for and justification of alternative formal institutions.115
Culture—as this Article conceptualizes it—encompasses both facets of Level 1 
institutions, namely, as constraints and as motivational factors. Culture operates as a 
constraint due to its nature as societies’ “common knowledge.” It thus coordinates 
people’s epistemics and expectations. This lowers the social costs for developing and 
sustaining norms that are compatible with prevailing cultural values. Culture operates 
to motivate and justify action compatible with its values through its impact on 
organizational policies and on the values of individual decision-makers.116
The horizontal structure of the pyramid model relates to the internal 
relationship between norms at the same level. The model assumes that such norms are 
interrelated. In Schwartz’s model, value dimensions constitute structured systems in 
themselves, with opposing and adjacent value types, thereby exhibiting a horizontal 
115 See Avner Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,102 J. Pol. Econ. 912 (1994); Victor 
Nee, A New Institutional Approach to Economic Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC 
SOCIOLOGY (Neil Smelser & Richard Swedberg, Eds., 2nd ed. Forthcoming 2003).
116
 Lilach Sagiv & Shalom H. Schwartz, A New Look at National Culture: Illustrative 
Applications to Role Stress and Managerial Behavior, in Handbook of Organizational Culture and 
Climate. 417 (Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste P.M. Wilderom, & Mark F. Peterson Eds. 2000); Peter B. 
Smith, M. F. Peterson, & Shalom H. Schwartz, with 49 co-authors, Do Cultural Values Predict 
Managerial Behaviors? A 47 Nation Study, 33 J. Cross-Cultural Psychol. 188 (2002); Shalom H. 
Schwartz, Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences around the World, in Comparing Cultures 
(Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters & Peter Ester Eds. forthcoming 2003).
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structure.117 Hence, deeply ingrained norms that are compatible with certain values in 
a society may also correlate with adjacent ones. For example, a norm of paying and 
receiving bribes—which is compatible with emphasizing Hierarchy—is also likely to 
be linked with the adjacent value type of Embeddedness. People may accept bribery 
as a benign fact of life if they believe that power differences in society are desirable 
(Hierarchy) and that social order must not be disrupted (Embeddedness).
Concrete norms at the higher levels of the pyramid may vary in their level of 
generality. Some norms may be of the most mundane kind yet associate with deeper-
strata norms. For example, Hofstede documented a correlation between carrying an 
identification card and countries’ rankings on Uncertainty Avoidance.118 Constantly 
carrying an ID card serves a generally felt need to reduce uncertainty, this time with 
regard to people’s identity. The same need probably also stands behind the enactment 
of such a mundane issue into law. Hofstede further argues that “in countries where the 
societal norm is one of greater uncertainty avoidance, the citizen feels more at the 
mercy of the authorities and his or her dependency is accentuated by the continuous 
need to be able to justify his or her identity by carrying a document.”119
Finally, saying that values and value dimensions constitute social norms does 
not entail that all behavioral regularities are necessarily linked to cultural values. 
Concrete norms may be so particular and context-specific that any relation to 
117 See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 30-31. Schwartz’s model depicts value types as organized 
in a circle. Adjacent types are conceptually close to one another (e.g., Autonomy and Egalitarianism) 
and conceptually opposing values (e.g., Autonomy versus Embeddedness) are found in diametrical 
positions. Hofstede’s model does not specify such theoretical structure but his value dimension do 
correlate with one another.
118 See HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES 1980, supra note 41, at 136.
119 Id., id..
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fundamental value dimensions would be too tenuous to be effective. The norm that 
paper presenters bring cookies to the faculty seminar is an example for such a case, no 
matter how strongly people may feel about obeying it.120 Social norms of this type—
namely, norms that are not rooted in general societal inclinations—might therefore be 
more susceptible to change and reform—a topic to which we now turn.
1. Application: The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm
To get a grasp of the pyramidal model, consider the need felt among students 
of comparative corporate governance to operationalize social norms and integrate 
them into their analyses. In the words of Jack Coffe:
“Although the relevance of norms cannot be denied, the problem with this 
debate is that it has an ineffable and subjective character. Of course, individuals 
internalize norms, seek to maximize their reputational capital, and function in teams 
that operate based on informal systems of consensus and cooperation. They do so 
within both corporations and all other forms of social organization. But once this is 
said, can any testable propositions be framed?”121
Of special interest in this field is the norm of shareholder wealth maximization 
in business corporations.122 The gist of this norm is that the corporation is run for the 
benefit of its shareholders – the investors of equity capital. In Anglo-American legal 
120 See Mitchell, supra note (discussing the norm of bringing cookies).
121
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
2151, 2151 (2001). See also Licht, supra note 73, at 159-65 (documenting awareness among 
comparative corporate governance scholars of the need to account for culture). 
122 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Norm, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability 
of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1999); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from 
Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2000) (hereinafter Political Preconditions); Mark Roe, 
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systems, where this norm prevails, shareholders are protected by a variety of legal 
measures.123 Other interested constituencies, such as creditors and employees, often 
must negotiate their protections contractually. Non-contractual parties have limited 
standing vis-á-vis the corporation, if at all.
Value dimension theories allow one to formulate concrete testable 
propositions about the relations that are likely to exist between specific norms of 
corporate governance and underlying societal emphases that promote them. Thus, 
societies in which the shareholder wealth maximization norm prevails expect people 
to fend for themselves. Societal members are encouraged to seek their fortune 
independently, sometimes at the expense of other constituencies. In Hofstede’s model, 
this norm is consistent with an emphasis on Individualism, which connoted 
selfishness. In Schwartz’s model, this norm is consistent with emphases on Autonomy 
and Hierarchy. Conversely, a stakeholder-rights norm of corporate responsibility 
toward other constituencies would be consistent with societal emphases on 
Collectivism and Egalitarianism, respectively.124
Now this is precisely the type of testable propositions called for by Coffee. In 
fact, these conjectures largely correspond with typical cultural profiles of English 
speaking counties versus Western European countries under Schwartz’s model.125 The 
former countries indeed adhere to shareholder wealth maximization whereas the latter 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norms and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063 
(2001).
123
 For a review of American case law, starting with the famous decision in Dodge v. Ford, 
204 Mich 459, 170 NW 668 (1919), see D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. 
CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998).
124
 For further development of this argument see Licht, supra note 81.
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countries find difficulties to abandon a stakeholder-interest norm.126 Moreover, the 
value dimension-based hypothesis is also consistent with Mark Roe’s politics-based 
theory about differences between corporate governance in Anglo-American countries 
versus social democratic (mostly West European) countries.127
A societal preference for Hierarchy would be reflected in emphases on values 
like wealth and social power.128 Societal endorsement of wealth and power as 
desirable values can manifest itself in all aspects of life, social norms being only one 
of them. However, even in the limited context of corporate governance norms, such 
endorsement may give rise to a number of more concrete norms, as wealth and power 
are the constitutive elements of corporate governance. In addition to shareholder 
wealth maximization, the combination of Hierarchy and Autonomy values may lead 
to greater tolerance toward hostile takeovers—a hallmark of Anglo-American 
corporate governance.129 This may be the case even if ensuing layoffs could be more 
disruptive in comparison to layoffs in egalitarian societies that maintain better social 
safety nets. Other examples include high levels of executive compensation130 and 
deference to managerial discretion, as reflected in the (legal) norm of business 
125 See Shalom H. Schwartz & Maria Ros, Values in the West: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Challenge to the Individualism-Collectivism Cultural Dimension, 1 WORLD PSYCHOL. 99 (1995).
126 See Roe, Political Preconditions, supra note 122.
127 Id.
128 See Schwartz, supra note 73, at 30-31.
129 See Eisenberg Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
1253, 1287-90 (1999) (discussing the emergence of a hostile takeover norm in the United States). See
also Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1717 (2001). 
130 See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on 
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1025-30 (2000); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. 
Fried, & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHIC. L. REV. 751-846 (2002).
43
judgment rule.131 All these norms share an underlying attitude of legitimation –
ranging from deference to respect to admiration – of individuals who take advantage 
of their wealth and power over others.
C. Emergence and Evolution of Social Norms
The notional model advanced thus far holds a potential contribution for 
understanding the emergence and evolution of social norms.132 Let us begin with 
analyses that adopt versions of the external approach to social norms. Ellickson 
advances an elaborate informal model of the evolution of social norms that depicts a 
market for social norms, complete with norm entrepreneurs, opinion leaders and other 
agents at the supply side, respective counterparts at the demand side, and currencies 
as suggested by Eric Posner and McAdams.133 Separately, Richard Posner and Eric 
Rasmusen present a sanction-driven theory of social norms in which some sanctions, 
shame and guilt, have a psychic element.134
131 See, e.g., Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and 
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001).
132
 In doing so, I restrict myself to the legal and law and economics literature on social norms. 
For economic perspectives on the evolution of culture and social norms see, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, 
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 137 (2000) (reviewing 
literature and advocating evolutionary theories); Robert Axelrod, The Dissemination of Culture: A 
Model with Local Convergence and Global Polarization, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 203 (1997) 
(reviewing literature and presenting model); Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, An Economist's 
Perspective on the Evolution of Norms, 150 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 45 (1994); Ken G. 
Binmore, The Evolution of Fairness Norms, 10 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 275 (1998); Randall C. 
Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. 
CHIC. L. REV. 1225 (1997). For an evolutionary psychology perspective, see Todd J. Zywicki, 
Evolutionary Psychology and the Social Sciences: A Bibliographic Article, 13 HUMANE STUD. REV. 1 
(2000); Paul H. Rubin, The State of Nature and the Evolution of Political Preferences, 3 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 50 (2001). McAdams, supra note 52, at  340n2 lists many non-legal sources about this 
subject.
133
 Ellickson, supra note 7. See also Dorothea Kubler, On the Regulation of Social Norms, 17 
J. L. ECON. & ORG. 449 (2001) (advancing an alternative model).
134 Posner & Rasmusen, supra note 68.
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External view theories of social norms have relatively less to gain from the 
present model than those that espouse the internal approach. In models like 
Ellickson’s or Posner and Rasmusen’s, cultural values may play a role in actors’ 
cost/benefit analysis inasmuch as they affect the exchange rate of sanctions. Models 
in this category do not rely on cultural values to explain or predict the emergence of 
certain types of norms. In theory, virtually every behavioral regularity could take hold 
and become a social norm.  Posner and Rasmusen acknowledge, however, that 
“[n]orms enforced by guilt and shame are particularly difficult to create or to 
change… Guilt and shame are heavily influenced by social conditioning, which is not 
quickly or easily altered either by individuals or by governments.”135
As was clarified above with regard to Kaplow and Shavell’s and Fehr and 
Falk’s positions, the value dimension framework generalizes this observation in its 
postulation that (1) values are imbued with feeling and carry a normative (injunctive, 
“ought”) load; and (2) values define the bases for social approval and disapproval.136
It follows that the more closely a social norm is linked to cultural values—namely, the 
more tightly it is associated with fundamental value dimensions—the less likely it is 
to change in response to exogenous shocks.137
Value dimensions can play a pivotal role in theories of social norms that rely 
on norm internalization. Recall that Cooter and Etzioni separately turn to theories of 
preeminent psychologists about the internalization of morality during child 
135 Id., at 27.
136
 This is also why prevailing values and deep-seated societal orientations operate as 
constraints on the development of norms in the institutional economic account.
137 Cf. Licht, supra note 73 (in the context of corporate governance, presenting culture as “the 
mother of all path dependencies”).
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development to explain the emergence of social norms and the internal motivation to 
comply with them.138 The issue of value acquisition is an open one at this stage. There 
has been little work on the topic because researchers assume that much of value 
acquisition occurs during childhood but cannot measure abstract values in childhood. 
The ability to engage in deontic reasoning about what one may, ought, or ought not to 
do in a given situation has been demonstrated in 3- and 4-year-old children.139 The 
assumption is that value learning is much like other learning in childhood and 
adolescence.140
In contrast with the external approach to social norms, the present model 
implies that not all behavioral regularities are equally likely to become social norms. 
Rather, behavioral regularities that are conceptually compatible with the surrounding 
normative environment—namely, the prevailing cultural orientations—are more 
likely to take root. As values feature at both the individual and societal levels of 
analysis, they simultaneously point to sources of motivation for compliance by 
individuals and to the direction of norm development by societies. People adhere to 
norms to the extent that such adherence triggers positive affective experience. Such 
triggering is more likely to occur the norm adhered to is compatible with widely-held 
values that express cultural orientations. 
138 See supra text to note 61 et seq.
139 See Denise D. Cummins, Evidence of Deontic Reasoning in 3- and 4-Year-Old Children, 
24 MEMORY & COGNITION 823 (1996).
140
  On internalization of cultural values at young ages see, e.g., Meg J. Rohan & Mark P. 
Zanna, Value Transmission in Families, in 8 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VALUES: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM
253 (Clive Seligman et al. eds 1996); Joan E. Grusec, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and Leon Kuczynski, 
New Directions in Analyses of Parenting Contributions to Children's Acquisition of Values, 71 CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 205 (2000); Judith Rich Harris, Where Is the Child’s Environment? A Group 
Socialization Theory of Development, 102 PSYCH. REV. 458 (1995). For an implementation of the value 
dimension framework at the individual level in this context, see Ariel Knafo & Shalom H. Schwartz, 
46
Against this backdrop, consider Richard Posner’s assertion about possible 
ways to combat bad social norms:
“Efforts to intervene at the norm-formation stage include schooling children 
in tolerance, public-spiritedness, law-abidingness, respect for rights, and so forth. But 
education that emphasizes the acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skills may 
undermine norm inculcation. It may encourage the student to think for himself and 
equip him with the specific intellectual tools for circumventing moral norms…”141
Posner expresses a generally negative view of norm internalization because 
“norm internalization reduces human freedom.”142 Yet in the present context he seems 
to be missing a crucial point. Education that emphasizes acquisition of knowledge and 
intellectual skills is norm inculcation; it does not undermine it. It is simply inculcation 
of particular values and not others. The value repertoire that Posner draws on strongly 
expresses certain value types—primarily Intellectual Autonomy and also 
Egalitarianism. This is not surprising because an emphasis on Autonomy in particular 
characterizes Western cultures.143
A close reading of Posner’s assertion reveals that it is, in fact, a fine example 
of the pyramidal model of norms. At the basis there lies a deeply ingrained (i.e., 
internalized) endorsement of Autonomy; so much so that it is actually unnoticed by its 
author. From this fundamental norm emanates a layer of more particular, yet still 
Value Socialization in Families of Israeli-Born and Soviet-Born Adolescents in Israel, 32 J. CROSS-
CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 213 (2001).
141 See Posner, supra note 52, at 367.
142 Id., id.
143
 The desirability of conducting one’s life as a free and equal rational agent is a common 
thread in Western thinking. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 55-56 (1859/1978); JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 560-61 (1971). For a cultural value dimension analysis see Schwartz & 
Ros, supra note 125.
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general, compatible norms: behavior rules that promote values like tolerance, respect 
for rights, and so forth. With this layer of norms in place, the stage is set for people to 
develop the myriad norms that govern their lives while paying little heed to moral 
preaches of older generations.
Here’s the rub: in societies that are high on Autonomy, parents (let alone 
grandparents) may want their children to follow their ways. But parents also take part 
in their children’s socialization process. Consequently, these parents instill in their 
children the very value preferences that would lead them to prefer breaking their own 
path to treading the path beaten by their parents. Stated more generally, society as a 
whole may internalize in children a set of cultural values that motivate them to seek 
autonomy and to respect others who do the same. Societies – or social subgroups, 
such as immigrants – whose cultural profile emphasizes different value dimensions 
may find it hard to implement such educational programs, however.144 The tools 
offered by the value dimension framework should prove helpful in identifying cultural 
cleavages of this nature and in the design of effective educational programs.
This Article says little about how cultures emerge and take form or whether 
they develop along a certain path. The implicit assumption thus far has been that 
social norms emerge in light (or under the shadow) of an existing cultural endowment. 
This is a static perspective taken for clarity of presentation. It should be clear that 
dynamic processes are always at work.145 Cultural value dimensions constitute the 
144
 For a review of acculturation and adaptation in adulthood see J. W. Berry & D.L. Sam, 
Acculturation and Adaptation, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 293 (2nd ed., J.W. 
Berry et al., eds 1997).
145
 In what regards the origins of informal social institutions contemporary scholars mostly 
offer broad conjectures. For example, Williamson, supra note 110, at 597, surmises that “informal 
institutions have mainly spontaneous origins.” BALKIN, supra note 90, asserts a sweeping theory of 
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backbone of a constantly developing body of social norms. As such, cultural 
emphases too may change. There is evidence that nations adapt their cultural value 
orientations in response to severe external shocks.146 It has been shown, for instance, 
that people in European countries that came under communist rule developed values 
that, first, were more compatible with life conditions under such a regime, and 
second, were distinctively different than the values prevailing in neighboring West 
European countries. In particular, East European societies exhibit significantly lower 
preferences for Autonomy and Egalitarianism compared with West European 
societies.147 These findings have direct implications for business practices, corporate 
governance reform, and democratization—all of which rely on certain general 
attitudes about individuals’ place in the economy and the polity.148
V. SOCIAL NORMS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The pyramidal model of social norms enables one to generalize about social 
norms and the law and to specify conditions for effective use of the law as a norm-
inducing means. Moreover, this model makes such arguments susceptible to empirical 
cultural evolution, seeking to explain both shared understandings and disagreement and diversity 
within cultures based on the transmission of cultural information embodied in “memes.” For another 
broad theory on the development of culture, see DEEPAK LAL, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE 
IMPACT OF FACTOR ENDOWMENTS, CULTURE, AND POLITICS ON LONG-RUN ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1998).
146
 In addition to responsiveness to shocks, cultures also exhibit correlation with economic and 
environmental conditions – a subject that exceeds the scope of this Article. See, generally, HOFSTEDE, 
CULTURE CONSEQUENCES, supra note 86; INGLEHART, supra note 74.
147 See Schwarz & Bardi, supra note 80.
148 See Schwarz & Bardi, supra note 80, argue that the values that were suitable for survival 
under communist rule are not conductive to personal entrepreneurship and competition. This could 
have been an invaluable insight for the Russian privatization project. See, with respect to corporate 
governance, Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and 
Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000) (specifying social and 
structural reasons for the failure to establish a functioning corporate sector in Russia in the wake of the 
collapse of communism); Amir N. Licht, Chanan Goldschmidt & Shalom H. Schwartz, Culture, Law, 
and Corporate Governance, INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming 2004) (elaborating on culture and 
corporate governance reform).
49
testing. This Part discusses these issues while concentrating on the social norm of 
obeying the law – the rule-of-law norm. This Part then classifies the rule-of-law norm 
as part of a broader category of norms dubbed “norms of governance” and 
demonstrates how the value dimension framework relates to it.
A. Social Norms and the Law
Interest in social norms has grown considerably over the last decade, inter 
alia, as a result of accumulating empirical evidence that social norms may replace 
legal norms in certain communities. In addition to Ellickson’s study of Shasta County 
ranchers,149 studies by Lisa Bernstein and Lior Strahilevitz have provided substantial 
support to this notion.150 Much of the debate revolves around the interrelations 
between social norms and the law. Of particular interest are ways to integrate the 
potency of informal social norms with the malleability of formal legal norms –
namely, how can the law be used to induce emergence of beneficial social norms. 
Ideally, people would abide by norms that were triggered by laws. Hence the 
depictions of law as having an expressive (rather than regulative), or focal point-
providing, role.151 Generalizing this point, Cooter called for promoting the “rule-of-
149
 Ellickson, supra note 3. 
150 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in 
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant 
Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996); 
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). Strahilevitz has extended the discussion of 
social norms from close-knit groups to loose -knit ones. See Strahilevitz, supra note 64; Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to Loose-Knit Groups, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
359 (2003).
151 See, e.g., Sunstein, Social Roles, supra note 52, at 2021-28 (arguing that the law can be 
used to change social attitudes); Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 52 at 914 (same); Cooter, 
supra note 52 at 587-88 (discussing use of social norms by lawmakers); Lessig, supra note 52 at 2182-
83 (discussing expressive function of law); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive 
Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000); see also Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive 
Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) (arguing that the law serves to signal attitudes).  On the difficulties of 
harnessing law to change social norms see Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the 
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law state,” in which state law is aligned with social norms such that citizens can 
economize on legal counsel by using morality as a guide to legality.152
The pyramidal model of social norms and the value dimension framework 
provide structure to these interrelations such that one could make concrete statements 
about the relations between culture, social norms, and the law – the fundamental 
elements of social order.153  Several arguments of this nature appear in the preceding 
sections and need not be repeated here. At bottom, the basic hypothesis is that the law 
would tend to be compatible with the cultural profile – stated in value dimension 
metrics – of the society that promulgated it.154 From this primary hypothesis one may 
derive many secondary hypotheses as a research agenda.
Hofstede argues, for instance, that “[u]ncertainty avoiding countries will have 
a greater need for legislation than will less-uncertainty-avoiding countries”155—a 
conjecture that clearly deserves careful testing. Anecdotally, Hofstede notes that 
“Germany has an extensive set of laws even for emergencies that might occur 
Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHIC. L. REV. 607 (2000). Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of 
Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 422 (1999) also recognizes the potential for controversial 
expressive use (“[C]ulturally embattled groups can use [the content of criminal law] to demonstrate… 
that their norms are worthy and ascendant and their cultural adversaries’ bankrupt and deviant.”) For a 
detailed critique of expressive theories of law, see Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000).
152 Robert D. Cooter, The Rule of State Law and the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of 
the Legal Foundations of Development, in 1996 ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON 
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 191 (1996).
153
 Compare Steven Shavell, Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. REV. L. 
AND ECON. 227, 227n1 (2002) (“Of course, law and morality work against the background of other 
important factors – market forces, reputational concerns, and the cultural environment – that influence 
our bahavior”) (italics added).
154 Cf. Williamson, supra note 110, at 597 (arguing that formal institutions (legal rules) “are 
pervasively linked with complementary institutions.”)
155 See HOFSTEDE, supra note 86, at 174 (italics in the original). One should be careful, 
however, to distinguish between “more legislation”, which may address higher uncertainty avoidance 
by formally regulating many life situations, and “more rights”, which may have the opposite effect due 
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(“Notstandgesetz”); Great Britain does not even have a constitution.”156 It should also 
be interesting to look for differences between various fields of law—e.g., property 
law versus constitutional law. It is possible further to compare societies that have 
developed their legal systems organically over generations versus societies that have 
experimented with legal transplantation – either voluntarily or as a result of 
imposition by foreign powers. In addition to such static comparisons, one expects 
culture to operate at the dynamic level as well, that is, to affect the development of 
legal systems by inducing path dependence dynamics.157
These are intriguing questions that have not been taken up until recently. In 
the field of corporate governance, Williamson and Stulz have used countries’ 
predominant religion as proxies for culture and obtain ambiguous results on levels of 
investor protection.158 In a joint study of this Author with Chanan Goldschmidt and 
Shalom Schwartz, however, we document robust correlation between measures of 
investors protection rights and value dimensions under both Schwartz’s and 
Hofstede’s models (Harmony and Uncertainty Avoidance, respectively).159 We further 
document theoretically consistent and robust correlations between these dimensions 
and measures of formalism in civil litigation rules around the world.160 Higher levels 
of formalism in court systems’ working is accompanied by cultural preferences for 




 For an argument in this spirit, see Licht, supra note 73.
158 See Rene M. Stulz & Rohan Williamson, Culture, Openness, and Finance, J. FIN. ECON. 
(forthcoming 2003).
159
 Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, supra note 148. Investor protection scores are taken from 
Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance,106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
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low Harmony and high Uncertainty Avoidance—both reflecting societal aversion 
toward dispute resolution processes whose outcome is indeterminate.161
B. The Rule of Law as a Social Norm
Perhaps the most fundamental question about social norms and the law 
concerns the relations between the content of the law (“law on the books”) and a 
general social norm of compliance with the law (“law in action”). Let us return to the 
Berkeley Hypo at the beginning of the text. The alleged promise of passing a pooper-
scooper municipal ordinance does not lie in its enforcement, which is certain not to be 
forthcoming. Rather, students of social norms conjecture, the ordinance’s real effect is 
to inform people about the right behavior.162 With the ordinance now in force, the 
pedestrian feels more confident that cleaning after one’s dog is the right thing – so 
much so that she is willing to approach a stranger and chastise him. The pedestrian 
also points to the justification: “It’s the law.” Drawing the rancher’s attention to the 
legal norm is not meant as a threat but as an argument of moral suasion. The 
pedestrian apparently assumes that the rancher shares her belief, that the law is a good 
160
 The formalism measures are taken from the Lex Mundi project conducted under the 
auspices of the World Bank by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer. See Simeon 
Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003).
161
 The results therefore confirm Oscar Chases’s argument that differences between the 
American and German civil procedure laws reflect deeper cultural differences captured by Hofstede’s 
theory and findings. Oscar G. Chase, Legal Processes and National Culture, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 1, 17-18 (1997). See also Oscar G. Chase, Some Observations on the Cultural Dimension in 
Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 861 (1997).  See, generally, MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE 
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1974-1975) whose study has informed both Chase and Djankov et al.
162 See sources supra note 7. 
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source for guidance about the right behavior.163 At least, authors who advance this 
hypothetical so believe.
The pedestrian’s assertion could be persuasive and motivate poop-scooping 
only if there existed a more fundamental social norm of complying with the law as 
such rather than for fear of sanction. I call it a rule-of-law social norm. In other words, 
this assertion relies on an implicit assumption that people are likely to obey particular 
legal norms (and incur the concomitant costs) because they uphold a deeper, more 
general norm of obeying the law. Such compliance may be due to whatever 
mechanism that may be in place, either internal or external. The rule-of-law norm thus 
serves as the interface between the informal system of social norms and the formal 
system of legal norms. Only in societies where this norm prevails can the law be used 
in its expressive mode. Where this interface is absent, the two systems are likely to 
run out of synch.
Prevalence of the rule-of-law social norm cannot be taken for granted, 
however. To be sure, the fact that a certain rule of conduct has taken the form of a 
formal legal rule may increase its normative character – the “ought” statement – in the 
eyes of many Americans. But even this limited conjecture is not self-evident: If the 
hypothetical pedestrian directed her rebuke to one of Ellickson’s Shasta County 
ranchers the latter might as well respond with “Is it?” or “So what?” Such a response 
would reflect the fact that some ranchers were not well-informed about the law and 
had developed alternative norms to govern relations with their neighbors. 
163
 Note that unlike the law that one should drive on the right-hand side of the road, Berkeley’s 
pooper-scooper ordinance does not serve to select a focal point in a coordination game. Absent 
potential punishment, it is a dominant strategy not to clean after one’s dog.
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Recall now the seat-belt use campaign that says “Buckle up! It’s the law.” The 
Buckle-up signs say nothing about Americans’ tendency to uphold a norm of using 
seat belts. Yet these signs do provide anecdotal evidence that Americans subscribe to 
a basic social norm of obeying the law as such. Associating seat belt use with obeying 
the law does more than just provide drivers with information about potential liability 
or with a focal point; it seeks to harness the power of the deep-level rule-of-law norm 
to motivate compliance with the concrete, upper-stratum seat-belt- use norm. 
Massachusetts’s public officials apparently believe that the fact that “it’s the law” can 
be a potent factor in motivating seat belt use because they believe that American 
drivers generally share a rule-of-law norm. Likewise, when the Washington Traffic 
Safety Commission prepares coloring sheets for children that say “Buckle up! It’s the 
law.”,164 it bundles these two messages as alternative statements of “It’s good for 
you.”
Should the World Bank therefore finance mass production of Massachusetts-
style Buckle-up signs in developing countries to encourage the use of seat belts? In 
my mind, it should not. Such signs may be effective only in societies whose cultural 
values are compatible with the rule-of-law social norm. Cultures in certain countries 
may emphasize other values and in particular, values that are opposed to those 
underlying the rule-of-law norm. Installing Buckle-up signs in such countries may 
even have a counter-effect by making local drivers resentful to seat belt use if the 
local culture does not emphasize the values that underlie the rule-of-law social norm. 
These same drivers, however, might heed to signs that said “Buckle up! It’s noble.” 
164 See supra note 2. 
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even though many Americans may find such signs silly or tasteless. To see why, let us 
briefly go back to first principles – a task undertaken in the following section.
C. The Rule of Law as a Norm of Governance
The rule of law obviously means more than just obeying municipal ordinances 
and their like. The rule of law is a complex concept on which many jurisprudence 
scholars differ. Indeed, the term “rule of law” itself is not used as such in every 
country. For instance, the German parallel Rechtsstaat and the French parallel 
Legalité each carry a somewhat different meaning. The most basic aspect of the rule 
of law is sometimes referred to as the “formalistic” or “procedural” aspect,165 or, more 
colloquially, as “law and order”. This aspect deals with the degree to which the 
behavior of individual persons and government authorities complies with formal legal 
rules. It is immaterial whether the rules are morally unjust or what political process 
(democratic or other) produced them.166  The only question is whether the rules are 
respected. The implicit assumption is that ordinarily—i.e., absent severe moral 
dilemmas—they should be. Conceptualizing the rule of law as a social norm implies 
that in societies that subscribe to this norm, private enforcement will complement or 
even substitute state enforcement of particular legal rules, as suggested by the 
Berkeley Hypo. This is the sense which underlies Cooter’s call for promoting the rule-
of-law state as opposed to the rule of state law.167
The rule of law is part of a larger family of norms that purport to regulate the 
exercise of power. Probably, it is the most fundamental norm among these norms. In 
165 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (1964; revised ed 1969); JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 154 (1971).
166 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 212-14 (1979).
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the public sphere, the norm against sale of public office is but one particular example. 
In the private sphere, norms against self-dealing in widely-held corporations also 
belong to this category.168 The entire family of norms of this type may be entitled 
“norms of governance”. The balance of this Section discusses the concept of 
governance and connects it to the pyramidal model and the value dimension 
framework.
The rule of law principle prescribes legitimate modes of wielding power; that 
is, it deals with use and abuse of power in the Hohfeldian meaning of this term.169 The 
essence of the rule of law is that power ought to be used only in ways allowed by the 
law.170 The types of power covered by the rule-of-law norm vary greatly. They range 
from long-term positions of power held by the state itself (as reflected in the German 
term Rechtsstaat) or state organs (as in the separation of powers doctrine), to holding 
a public office. This continuum goes on to holding an executive office in a business 
corporation and to short-term, fleeting situations that allow for opportunistic behavior. 
Typical short-term situations occur, for instance, during sequential performance of 
contractual obligations, or when performance is unobservable or unverifiable. 
167
 Cooter, supra note 152.
168
 Compare Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 129 (discussing norms within corporations).
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 In the 1910s, Wesley Hohfeld advanced an elegant diagrammatic model of dyadic 
relationships between legal statuses that included a dyadic relationship between power and liability. 
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16 (1913) (hereinafter Hohfeld 1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917). According to Hohfeld, “[the] person (or 
persons) whose volitional control is paramount may be said to have the (legal) power to affect the 
particular change of legal relations that is involved in the problem.” Hohfeld 1913, id., at 44. Liability 
is simply a correlative concept of power, denoting the status of the other party as subject to the first 
party’s power. Hohfeld later consolidated his model  in WESLEY N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING, (W.W. Cook, ed. 1919; reprint 1964). For a general 
analysis of Hohfled’s framework, see ANDREW HALPIN, RIGHTS AND LAW: ANALYSIS AND THEORY
(1997).
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Needless to say, even countries that subscribe to a rule-of-law norm may differ 
considerably in the circumstances to which they apply this norm.
Traditionally, “governance” connoted authoritative direction or control, with
clear public/political connotations and a focus on the executive branch of 
government.171 The term became popular during the 1990s mainly as a consequence 
of the World Bank’s institutional reform agenda. A representative World Bank 
definition reads as follows:
“We define governance as the traditions and institutions by which authority 
in a country is exercised for the common good. This includes (i) the process by which 
those in authority are selected, monitored and replaced, (ii) the capacity of the 
government to effectively manage its resources and implement sound policies, and 
(iii) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.”172
The World Bank’s agenda concentrates on promoting the rule of law and 
accountability and curbing corruption with a view to fostering economic 
development. The international financial institutions and the United Nations often 
prefer to define “good governance” – a usage that more explicitly reflects the 
teleological, purposive character of the definition.173 While I concur with the gist of 
170 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(8th ed., 1914).
171
 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (internet edition), <http://www.m-w.com/>
172 WORLD BANK GROUP, GOVERNANCE, FINANCE AND REGULATION (2003), 
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/wbigf/governance.html>. 
173 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE vii (1994) (“Good 
governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent 
processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government 
accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.”); INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, DECLARATION OF PARTNERSHIP FOR 
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the definitions—namely, the modes of wielding power and responses thereto—one 
may note that they focus almost exclusively on exercising power in the public sphere.
Limiting the definitions of governance to the public sphere renders them 
unnecessarily narrow. Governance in the private sphere—as in corporate governance, 
for instance—also consists of rules and structures for wielding power over other 
people’s interests, namely, for tackling the agency problem.174 Compliance with legal 
rules, loyal corporate stewardship, and accountability could be guiding principles –
and social norms – for private interactions just as these norms could apply to the 
public service. Norms about abuse of market power by dominant firms is another 
example for norms of governance in the private sphere, which also exemplifies the 
ambiguity of the private/public distinction.175
Numerous social interactions involve people and institutions in different 
power positions, in the very broad sense used here. A central feature of such 
interactions, on which societies may differ, is the degree to which these interactions 
are unilateral or bilateral. A unilateral interaction occurs when the exercise of power 
is not accompanied by the affected party’s prior awareness of or consent. In a bilateral 
interaction, the affected party is aware of the exercise of power or gives its consent to 
SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL GROWTH (1996) (“promoting good governance in all its aspects, including by 
ensuring the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling 
corruption."); Kofi Annan, The Quiet Revolution, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 123, 123 (1998) (“U.N. 
programs now target virtually all the key elements of good governance: safeguarding the rule of law; 
verifying elections; training police; monitoring human rights; fostering investments; and promoting 
accountable administration.”). The British Council endorses an expansive definition for its worldwide 
governance program: “[t]he process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and
influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social 
development. Governance is a broader notion than government. Governance involves interaction 
between these formal institutions and those of civil society.”) BRITISH COUNCIL, BRITISH COUNCIL ON 
GOVERNANCE (2001), <http://www.britishcouncil.lk/governance/>.
174 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 
737 (1997).
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it. Bilateral interactions may be viewed as relatively more transparent; unilateral 
interactions are more opaque. In general, societies that emphasize pursuit of 
individual preferences and view individual persons as equal would endeavor to 
establish a more transparent environment such that individual members of society 
would be able to better plan their moves. In contrast, societies that put less emphasis 
on these values will more easily accommodate opaque wielding of power.
The rule of law seems to be the most fundamental norm of governance, in both 
its legal and social norm versions. The rule of law stipulates that the law must govern 
the use of power—that is, the people in power positions should consult the law, as 
opposed to tradition or advice from elders (or their personal interests), in their 
exercise of power. More concretely, the rule of law entails that people are entitled to 
rights and freedoms—to the extent that they are stipulated by the law—e.g., of 
property and contract, and in democracies, also of speech. In a rule-of-law state, these 
rights and freedoms are protected from encroachment by the state’s overwhelming 
power or by other citizens. 
The upshot of the rule-of-law norm is that people can better plan their 
independent moves in a complex world. They can more safely assume that their 
contracts will be honored and their property be protected. People may also feel free 
openly to express what is on their mind, provided that they do not defame other 
societal members. They can further assume that public services, including 
adjudication of disputes, will be rendered in a predictable manner, unaffected by 
personal connections.
175 See, generally, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 98-123 (William W. Fisher et al. eds 1993).
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D. Testable Hypotheses and Some Evidence
The pyramidal model suggests that the cultural environment promotes and 
facilitates the emergence and perpetuation of particular norms of governance. The 
prevailing values broadly define what is desirable in a society. Modes of wielding 
power that are compatible with prevailing value emphases are therefore more likely to 
be accepted as normative. This compatibility provides the norms of governance with 
legitimacy. Such legitimacy is necessary to trigger social incentive mechanisms for 
rewarding compliant behavior and for punishing deviant behavior. Governance norms 
that are incompatible with the cultural value environment will lack legitimacy and are 
therefore unlikely to take root.
One can thus proceed to derive testable hypotheses about cultural preferences 
that would be more conductive (or inimical) to a social norm that calls on people to 
obey the law.
Endorsing the rule of law as an overarching norm is consistent with societal 
emphasis on values of Autonomy and Egalitarianism in Schwartz’s model. The gist of 
the Autonomy value types is the perception of people as bounded entities who find 
meaning in their own uniqueness. When the rule-of-law state provides people with a 
comprehensive set of rights and freedoms and effectively enforces them, it does 
exactly that. This, I believe, is the rationale underlying Richard Posner’s endorsement 
of “schooling children in… law-abidingness [and] respect for rights” as part of an 
“education that emphasizes the acquisition of knowledge and intellectual skills.”176
Law-abidingness and respect for rights rely on a deeper societal emphasis on 
176 See Posner, supra note 52, at 367.
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Autonomy (which the quotation mentions the intellectual aspect thereof). 
Emphasizing Egalitarianism is compatible with the rule-of-law norm as it reflects a 
perception of societal members as moral equals, entitled to equal protection under the 
law. In contrast, the rule-of-law norm is less likely to prevail in societies that 
emphasize Embeddedness, in which respect for tradition, honoring elders, and 
obedience are dominant values.
In Hofstede’s model, the rule-of-law norm is mostly compatible with societal 
emphases on Individualism and low Power Distance. Societal members in 
individualistic societies are expected, if not urged, to pursue their own (sometime 
selfish) goals in life. A rule-of-law state provides a better environment for them to 
achieve these goals by setting a legal framework that allows every person to have her 
fair chance to do that. Societies high on Collectivism find less importance in 
protecting individual members’ interests and satisfying their preferences. Collectivism 
expresses a premise that the interests of a wider group take precedence over 
individual members’ interests. High Power Distance implies, inter alia, legitimation 
of people taking advantage of power positions. In the present context, this would be 
done notwithstanding formal legal rules that provide otherwise. At the individual 
level, people in high Power Distance societies may not like to be taken advantage of 
yet accept this as a fact of life in their social environment.
The present analysis does not purport to reject existing theories on why people 
obey the law. Rather, my goal is to put such theories in a general universal context 
such that they could be applied more effectively both domestically (in the United 
States) and in other countries. A case in point is Tom Tyler’s influential study Why 
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People Obey the Law177 and subsequent research with colleagues. Briefly, it has been 
shown that Americans are more likely to uphold legal injunctions, even at a personal 
cost, when they perceive the process that yielded such injunctions as fair. Issues found 
to be of particular importance to subjects are the opportunity to participate and 
provide input, the neutrality of procedure, and being treated with dignity, respect, and 
honesty.178
Obvious as they may seem to many Americans, these issues—like Posner’s 
assertion—strongly express values of Autonomy and Egalitarianism. These values 
prevail in English speaking countries, and even more so in Western Europe, but are 
much less prevalent in other regions of the world.179 One should therefore exercise 
caution in drawing policy implications for other countries from the American 
findings. While people in other countries may share the desire to be treated 
respectfully, their judgment parameters for what this means likely will reflect their 
different cultural profile.180 Similar considerations should apply to law abidingness in 
multicultural societies. Tyler and his colleagues have expressed guarded optimism in 
this regard with respect to the United States,181 but these views may need to be 
177 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
178 See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, in 25 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (Mark Zanna Ed. 1992); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen 
Discontent with Legal Procedures, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997); Tom Tyler, Obeying the Law in 
America: Procedural Justice and the Sense of Fairness, ISSUES OF DEMOCRACY, July 2001, available at 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/joournals/itdhr/0701/jide/tyler.htm>.
179
 Shalom H. Schwartz, Mapping and Interpreting Cultural Differences around the World, in 
COMPARING CULTURES (Henk Vinken, Joseph Soeters & Peter Ester Eds., forthcoming 2003).
180
 E. Allan Lind, Yuen J. Huo, & Tom R. Tyler, … And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender and 
Preferences for Dispute Resolution Procedure. 18 L. & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 269 (1994) found that 
Americans, Germans, and Hong Kong Chinese subjects exhibited minor difference in evaluating the 
fairness of procedures. Note, however, that Germany is a West European country and that Hong Kong 
has been under strong British influence for a long period.
181
 Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to 
Legal Authorities, 25 L. & SOC’L INQUIRY 983 (2000); Yuen J. Huo, Heather J. Smith, Tom R. Tyler, 
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reassessed in light of recent evidence on value differences among ethnic groups in the 
U.S.182 Relatedly, Tyler, E. Allan Lind, and Yuen Huo noted that effectiveness of 
dispute resolution procedures may depend on respondents’ position on Hofstede’s 
Power Distance value dimension.183
More recently, several scholars have connected experimental economics and 
insights from social norms analysis to law-abidingness. Iris Bohnet and Robert Cooter 
examined the effect of framing a negative payoff as a legal penalty on social dilemma 
games in sample of American students.184 They find that such framing is helpful in 
games with multiple equilibria. Bohnet and Cooter conclude that before making a law 
whose enforcement is ineffective (such as a ban on smoking or littering in pubic 
places), lawmakers must “understand citizens very well,” because such laws hinge on 
“the underlying normative system.”185 Using a sample of Swiss students, Jean-Robert 
Tyran and Lars Feld have demonstrated that people may obey a rule backed only by 
mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum.186 Lastly, Richard McAdams and 
Janice Nadler examine the idea that law operates expressively by creating focal points 
& E. Allan Lind, Superordinate Identification, Subgroup Identification, and Justice Concerns,7 
PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 40 (1996).
182
 Heather M. Coon & Markus Kemmelmeier, Cultural Orientations in the United States, 32 
J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 348 (2001) (documenting differences in individualism and collectivism 
between the four largest ethnic groups in the United States).
183 See Tom R. Tyler, E. Allan Lind, & Yuen J Huo, Cultural Values and Authority Relations: 
The Psychology of Conflict Resolution across Cultures, 6 PSYCHOL. PUBLIC POLICY & L. 1138 (2000); 
see also E. Allan Lind, Tom R. Tyler, & Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Context and Culture: Variations in 
the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC’L PSYCHOL. 767 (1997).
184 See Iris Bohnet & Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection? 
(Working paper 2003).
185 Id., at 18-19.
186 See Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence 
from the Provision of Public Goods (Working paper 2001).
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in games with multiple equilibria. These authors find that this effect was stronger 
when the expressing agent was selected by a merit-based process.187
The results of these studies are consistent with the present theory. In various 
degrees of explicitness, each of these studies relies on some underlying normative 
premise shared by the subjects of each experiment as a precondition for compliance 
that not driven by deterrence. Bohnet and Cooter indeed make this point their central 
conclusion. In Tyran and Feld’s study, one cannot avoid noting that by conducting a 
referendum among Swiss subjects these researchers likely have invoked the strong 
societal emphases on Autonomy and Egalitarianism that a referendum embodies, 
especially in Switzerland. This experimental setting is conceptually similar to (indeed 
bolder than) experiments in which psychologists have triggered subjects’ cultural 
affiliation by making that culture more salient to them.188 McAdams and Nadler’s 
finding, that a merit-based selection of the person suggesting the focal point, 
indirectly implies that group judgment as to what would be considered merit-based 
likely will vary across social groups and cultures.
The above hypotheses suggest that from a cultural value perspective, the rule 
of law may not be perceived as a universal good in all societies. Under the present 
analysis, the law serves as an independent source of guidance about the right 
behavior, available to all on equal terms. Societies whose cultural values emphasize 
187 See Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing 
for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game (Working paper 2003).
188 See Ying- yi Hong, Michael W. Morris, Chi-yue Chiu, & Veronica Benet-Martinez, 
Multicultural Minds: A Dynamic Constructivist Approach to Culture and Cognition, 55 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 709 (2000). These researchers primed Chinese-American bi-cultural participants with 
iconic images associated with either Chinese or American cultures. It was shown that when implicit 
cultural theories were applicable to the stimulus, priming manipulation influenced participants’ 
judgments.
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Embeddedness and Hierarchy, or Collectivism and Power Distance, would direct 
societal members to seek guidance in other sources, primarily in superiors’ or elderly 
people’s advice. There is evidence that this is indeed the case.
Social psychologists who compared American subjects with East Asian 
(especially Chinese and Korean) subjects agree that the former are more 
individualistic than the latter.189 Korea’s scores on Hofstede’s dimensions reflect 
societal preferences for high Collectivism, high Uncertainty Avoidance, moderately 
high Power Distance, moderate Masculinity, and high Long-term Orientation.190
Korea also scores higher than the U.S. on Embeddedness versus Autonomy. In the 
Schwartz data, Korea’s scores reflect societal preferences for Embeddedness over 
Autonomy, and for Hierarchy over Egalitarianism, and for Mastery over Harmony.191
These differences on the Individualism-Collectivism and Autonomy-
Embeddedness dimensions are accompanied by significant differences in numerous 
issues.192 Eun-Yeong Na has found that “Koreans (especially non-experts) tend to 
respect Confucian ethics more than the codified laws. Thus, Koreans might aid in 
their fathers’ or bosses’ illegal activities even if they clearly know the illegal nature of 
such activities.” Na avers that “Koreans are not willing to abandon their important 
189 See Richard E. Nisbett et al., Cultures as Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic 
Cognition, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 291 (2001); Kaiping Peng, Daniel R. Ames & Eric Knowles, Culture 
and Human Inference, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 245 (D. Matsumoto ed., 2001); 
Alan P. Fiske et al., The Cultural Matrix of Social Psychology, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
915 (D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske & G. Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). In their conceptualization of 
individualism and collectivism these studies rely primarily on Hazel R. Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, 
Culture and the Self: Implication for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PYSCHOL. REV. 224 
(1991).
190 HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES, supra note 86, at 500.
191
 Shalom H. Schwartz, Relations of Culture to Social Structure, Demography and Policy in 
the Study of Nations, Invited Lecture Delivered at the 25th International Congress of Applied 
Psychology, Singapore, July 2002 (on file with author).
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interpersonal relationships just to abide by the law.”193 Comparing Americans’ and 
Koreans’ positions toward the law, Na and Elizabeth Loftus in a separate study have 
shown that Korean undergraduate students showed negative attitudes toward law and 
low trust in the legal system. Koreans also had less positive attitudes toward strict 
enforcement of law than did Americans.194 Granted, Korea’s transformation toward 
democratization and market economy may exert pressure also on its cultural 
orientation and general attitudes toward the law.195 It is not clear, however, how much 
these changes can fundamentally change the Korean culture.196
Finally, in a large cross-sectional study with Goldschmidt and Schwartz,197 we 
find that levels of perceived legality (rule of law), non-corruption, and democratic 
accountability strongly and systematically correlate with higher Individualism and 
lower Power Distance in Hofstede’s model. Better governance norms also correlate 
with higher Autonomy and Egalitarianism in Schwartz’s model. These are the cultural 
values that Confucian countries tend to de-emphasize. In a regional comparison, Far 
Eastern countries on average score significantly lower on all measures of governance 
relative to English-speaking and West European countries. The societal emphases 
192
 For reviews, see, e.g., Nisbett et al., supra note 189.
193
 Eun-Yeong Na & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Attitudes Toward Law and Prisoners, Conservative-
Authoritarianism, Attribution, and Internal-External Locus of Control: Korean and American Law 
Students and Undergraduates, 29 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 595 (1998) (citing Eun-Yeong Na, A 
Psychological Analysis of Legal Beliefs in Korean Law Experts and Non-Experts, 14 LAW & SOCIETY
176 (1997) (in Korean)).
194
 Na & Loftus, id. Similar but less stark differences were found in samples of law students. 
195
 For a general insightful discussion of the current situation in Korea, see Chaihark Hahm, 
Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253 (2003).
196 See Jae-Ho Cha, Aspects of Individualism and Collectivism in Korea, in INDIVIDUALISM 
AND COLLECTIVISM: THEORY, METHOD, AND APPLICATIONS 157, 170 (Uichol Kim et al. Eds. 1994) 
(finding that despite changes toward Individualism, Koreans in both young and old age groups were on 
the whole collectivist in absolute terms).
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 Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, supra note 73.
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reflected in these findings are compatible with diametrical views about the rule of law 
as a desirable basis of social order that were expounded generations ago by Socrates 
and Confucius.198 Overall, these findings lend support to the model presented in this 
Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article argues that social norms need to be analyzed as an interdependent 
system rather than isolated regularities. The study of social norms and their relation to 
the law should benefit from implementing a notional model of a pyramid of social 
norms that relies on the psychology of values. Adopting the framework advanced in 
this Article is compatible with the different views of social norms currently proposed 
by law and economics scholars – namely, external, exchange-based theories and 
internal, morality-based theories. The present model may thus serve as a bridge 
toward a unified theory of social norms. Beyond advancing social norms theory, the 
proposed framework also holds a promise for advancing our understanding of the 
relations between social norms and the law and between social norms and the 
overwhelming concept of culture.
The foregoing analysis of the rule of law can be repeated along the same lines 
with respect to other norms of governance. The pyramidal model implies that 
inasmuch as other norms have a similar effect on governance systems, they are likely 
198
 Socrates’s refusal to escape from jail after the city of Athens sentences him to death is 
often presented as the classic exposition of arguments for the duty to obey the law and, generally, for 
the importance of the rule of law for social order. At about the same time, in equally powerful terms 
Confucius derided the rule of law as a means for establishing social order in China. On Socrates, see, 
e.g., M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950 (1972-
1973); Philip Soper, Another Look at the Crito, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 103 (1996); Frances Olsen, Socrates 
on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil Disobedience, 18 GA. L. REV. 929 (1984); on 
Confucius see, e.g., William P. Alford, On the Limits of ‘Grand Theory’ in Comparative Law, 61 
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to exhibit similar correlations with value dimensions to those that were posited with 
regard to the rule of law. To the extent that the hypotheses advanced in this Article are 
confirmed by empirical evidence, such evidence will imply that instilling a rule-of-
law norm in countries where it currently does not prevail would to be a daunting task. 
People in such countries may find the content of the rule-of-law norm attractive yet 
incompatible with the social environment in which they live. Development programs 
aimed to promote the rule-of-law state paradigm (or rely on it) therefore must take 
into account the cultural environment to which they are targeted.
WASH. L. REV. 945 (1986); Albert H.Y. Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in 
Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 125 (1999-2000).
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FIGURES
Figure 1. The Schwartz Model of Relations Among Cultural Orientations 
        Embeddedness Harmony
      Egalitarianism
      Hierarchy
Intellectual
Autonomy
      Mastery       Affective
      Autonomy
Based on Shalom H. Schwartz, Cultural Value Differences: Some Implications for Work, 48 APPL’D 
PSYCHOL. INT’L REV. 23 (1999).
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Figure 2. The Williamson Model of Social Institutions
Based on Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. 
ECON. LIT. 595 (2000).
Level 1 – Embeddedness: 
informal institutions, customs, traditions, 
norms, religion
Level 2 – Institutional environment: 
formal rules of the game – especially property 
(polity; judiciary; bureaucracy)
Level 3 – Governance: 
play of the game – especially contract 
(aligning governance structures with 
transactions)
Level 4 – Resource allocation and employment 
(prices and quantities; incentive alignment)
